IMT Nuremberg Archives

H - 5126

International Court of Justice

H5126-0002

AFFIDAVITS PRESENTED TO THE COMMISSION

SA

1. Mr. Menge (Enclosures 1 and 3)
2. Kurt Blome
3. Willy Ney
4. K. H. Koch
5. Georg Zelnhefer
6. Georg Mappes
7. Hans Reimann
8. Hans Petersen
9. Alexander Grosskopf
10. Jos. Cardinalis Frings
11. Franz Von Hoerauf
12. Proffessor D. Cajus Fabricius
13. Leonhard Gontermann
14. Edgar Stelzner

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Considerations on the Nuernberg Indictment

After the capitulation of the German Armed Forces and abolition of the Nazi domination, the world celebrated the victory of liberty over enslavement, the victory of right over force. A deep sense relief pervaded suffering, oppressed humanity. The leaders of the victorious powers proclaimed the grave and highly important task that still remained to be accomplished: There must never again be a domination and triumph of force over right, of the power of a few over human justice.

Justice demanded atonement for the past, investigation of the guilt of Nazism and punishment of the guilty.

This task is based on the question:

What are the circumstances which led to the unlimited power of Nazism under the leadership of HITLER in Germany and who bears the guilt for the crimes committed by this tyranny?

The primary requisite for a proper answer to this question is to see the situation as it was then and not as it now appears in retrospect in the light of our present knowledge of the circumstances.

The situation in Germany seemed desperate in 1932. 7 million unemployed, that is to say, about half the total of workers, bankruptcy/after bankruptcy in the economic field, ruin of the middle class. All trade and production was stalled, the revenue of German economy had dwindled to a third. Hopeless situation of agriculture: over-indebtedness and liquidations of property. Farms covering an area the size of the State of Hesse, i.e., 7692 square kms. were sold by auction. Unrest among the farmers was the result. Everyone felt that the foundation of his economic existence was shaken. Crime increased.

The government of that time was helpless in the face of this desperate situation. Two radical currents offered themselves for the salvation of the German nation. As a desperate patient gives himself into the hands of a radical "miracle curer", the masses in Germany turned to these radical currents. On the one side stood the leftist radicals who, for the accomplishment of their cure demanded the abolition of almost all the values of Western civilization (personality, religion, private enterprise etc.) and

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accompanied their doctrine of salvation with the threat: "And if you won't be my brother, I'll knock your skull in". On the other side, the rightist radicals promised to remove all distress with due regard for property, private enterprise and Christianity. The political position of the government became so difficult under this assault from left and right that one dissolution of the Reichstag followed another and the government lost control of the situation, despite emergency decrees and the plea of "exceptional conditions".

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It was then that President von HINDENBURG, who enjoyed the highest regard within the German nation as well as throughout the whole world, appointed HITLER Reich Chancellor. With the agreement of a section of the Social-Democrat and Center representatives, the Reichstag vested HITLER with full powers by the qualified majority required for a modification of the constitution. In this way, large sections of the German people who still viewed HITLER with aversion or distrust were induced to wait and see. If the Reich President and the Reichstag as the responsible political institutions of the German Nation adopted this attitude with regard to HITLER and his party, could it then occur to the German people that HITLER and his organizations pursued criminal aims? Indeed, the highest German Court had acknowledged some time before (1930) that HITLER worked with legitimate methods. Since HINDENBURG's desire for peace was beyond doubt (it was again acknowledged by the press of the whole world at his death in 1934) the Nation did not see any danger to peace in the investiture of HITLER by HINDENBURG. Moreover, dust was thrown in the people's eyes: thus in 1933 and 1934 a major celebration was staged every few weeks to divert, as was admitted to me later by the National Socialists, the people's attention from the rearmament which was beginning. Neither did foreign countries assume a hostile attitude toward HITLER's regime. He was even allowed to score political successes which had been denied to the preceding democratic government: re-incorporation of the Saar territory, the naval treaty with England (which signified a revision of the Treaty of Versailles), toleration of the re-militarization of the Rhineland. The reproach is now directed against the German people, even down to the plainest citizen, that they should have recognized, as early as 1938 and afterwards, the HITLER government as criminal and opposed resistance, but until 1939 the Allies themselves treated HITLER as a trustworthy contracting party and repeatedly legitimized him. Thus, according to a newspaper report (Hannov. Nachrichtenblatt dated 1.11.45), a German Socialist Party leader, Dr. SCHUMACHER said at a large public function in Kiel: "We were in concentration camps while other nations still concluded alliances with the Reich Government".

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The Christian background of the new State was ostentatiously stressed. A concordat was concluded with the Holy See. The opening of the first Reichstag in Potsdam was opened with a religious service. In the municipalities, as was the case in Hanover, the investiture of the municipal officials was given a religious form by addresses made by clerics of both religious, an unprecedented occurrence.

The anti-semitism already proclaimed by HITLER before his seizure of power, which actually provided a place for the Jews in the Party program, was rejected by large sections of the Nation and was not then considered, even by National Socialist leaders as serious as it later - to the horror of the German People - proved to be. It was at the time considered more as an instrument of election propaganda. However, we have seen, for instance, the case in

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Hanover of the highest ranking SA officer at the time, Gruppenfuehrer Corsemann, being the house guest of prominent Jews and the oldest veterans (holders of the badge of honor) declare themselves in favour of the maintenance of a Jewish lawyer in office. Even the Reich Government availed itself of the services of Jewish banking firms until 1937 and the participation by jews in the Olympic Games of 1936 was not prohibited. The revolutionary ontrages (assault and mob violence) which took place at the time were even condemned but considered as ephemeral revolutionary phenomena attendant upon the times. All this, along with many other factors not mentioned here, must be taken into consideration when subsequently uttering critical judgment on membership in the NSDAP or one of its branch organizations. Must those joining have been aware that it meant joining a "criminal organization"?

After Hitler had thus, thanks to the Reich President and the Reichstag, attained an incredible power, he abused it to an ever-increasing extent. The parties saw themselves obliged to dissolve and it was forbidden by law to found new ones. The only organization still existing outside of the National Socialist organizations, the "Stahlhelm", was incorporated into the SA. Having been dituled in this way, the SA was laid aside after the Roehm's murder and occupied with parades and sports, under the leadership of the harmless Lutze, whereas the SS was reorganized under the leadership of Himmler into a political instrument bound by a life and death allegiance to Hitler. With the SS, the Gestapo and the SD, Hitler then introduced in Germany an a constantly more severe and bloody dictatorship which did not shrink from any acts of violence. Indeed, the full measure of these was not know to the German people since their secrecy was imposed under the most severe threats, but all resistance on the part of the powerless nation was nipped in the bud. They included, as Count 4 of the Nuernberg Indictment has it, "the murder and prosecuting of all those who were supposedly hostile to the Nazi party or suspicious of it, or were in opposition to the Plan expounded in Count I of the Indictment or suspicious of it."

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The general picture briefly traced above for the exposition of the circumstance leading to this unbounded power of Hitler and Nazism in Germany contains at the same time the general answer to the question of who bears the guilt for the crimes perpetrated by this tyranny. It would lead us too far, within the framework of this brief exposition, to probe further into the particular groups named in the Indictment. As an example, we shall only take into particular consideration those matters concerning the SA. Was the SA a criminal organization and did its members make themselves guilty of participation in a criminal organization by joining it or remaining in it ? True, the SA was originally a political organization with which Hitler staged his propaganda processions, with possibly the use of force against counter-demonstrations, though

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not against the authority of the State, and with which he also disturbed rival manifestations. The SA, however, lost its original character to a very considerable extent when the "Stahlhelm" was incorporated in it. The "Stahlhelm", besides being numerically superior to the original SA, in any case brought its mentality to the SA, a mentality essentially different from that of the SA, and incarnated the sort of spirit that is also cultivated by ex-service men's organizations in other countries, its counterparts abroad. Indeed, the Stahlhelm, what is more, introduced a great number of men into the SA whose political attitude were hostile towards the Nazis. These men had for the most part joined the Stahlhelm in 1933 at the instigation of Social Democrat leaders when, the parliamentary system having been crushed and the political parties dissolved, the Stahlhelm remained the sole representative of a major organization which could be expected to counter-balance the Nazis. (That even HITLER saw a danger for himself in the Stahlhelm is shown by the fact that he repeatedly postponed and sought to prevent the celebration of the Stahlhelm Day in 1933). That this expectation was not fulfilled by the leaders of the Stahlhelm and that the latter was on the other hand incoporated into the SA was a great disappointment for many of its members. However, an important modification was introduced in the character of the SA. This was probably brought about by HITLER immediately after the ROEHM affair to create a reliable political combat formation for himself in the newly organized SS. The former Stahlhelm men were mostly divided amongst the "SA Reserves" as elderly gentlemen and employed in harmless occupations, such as blocking streets, filling reunion halls, collecting for the Winter Relief and attending good fellowship reunions in the evening, when they made any appearence at all. Withdrawal from the SA (unless involving a more private) was a step that a member could not venture to take. A campaign of slander and the ruin of his professional life would be the consequences and surveillance by the Gestapo would forestall him everywhere and make any act of opposition impossible from the first. Besides this personal reason, however, it was the sense of obligation to their field of duty and their responsibility to the community which induced officials and employees, especially in leading positions, to give the outward signs of

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allegiance, even if they were inwardly hostile. They did not abandon the ship, but tried to save what could be saved and prevent a complete plunge into bestiality. Yet British Foreign Minister BEVIN has declared recently that the English Government had hoped to be able to rebuild on the remnants of the old German civil service, but that the Nazists had destroyed it all in the end. If none the less there are still men to-day at the disposal of the Allies as experienced specialists for the work of reconstruction, it is because such men contrived to evade the terroristic methods of the Nazis. What those terrorist methods were need not be further described here. They are sufficiently thoroughly and clearly exposed in Count 4. In the concentration camps, there were mainly Germans. The terrible conditions as found there by the Allied troops give a staggering picture of the rule of terror over the German people themselves and the very large number of prisoners

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constitutes, as the English radio once declared, the best document for the exculpation of the German people. A large part of the members of such an organization as the SA were likewise inwardly opposed to Nazism and sought to contrive a camouflage so that they could protect those industries, firms and other economic and social concerns within their professional care for the benefit of the community.

The younger men composed the SA proper which was particularly trained in sport activities, such as military sport. It received its new recruits from the HITLER Youth and student bodies, on a compulsory basis in a certain sense, which subsequently induced the actively National Socialist -minded youth to turn to the SS. Those youth, in particular, who were reluctant to enter the Party but who had to show up that they belonged to some kind of organization out of consideration for their professional future joined the SA Organization, which appeared less political than sporting. Unlike the SS, membership to the SA was not subordinated to the premary reguisite of membership to the Party. Thus, SA members were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Party Tribunal.

If SA members are also charged with participation in the pogrom against the Jews in November 1938, such participation was not, so far as I can visualize, official. It was probably, HIMMLER, the leader of the SS, who ordered these excesses in the name of HITLER. Both the leaders and the members on many occasions refused to comply with demands from above. These facts speak against regarding the SA in a general and unconditional way as a criminal formation.

Neither could the SA be regarded as a military organization in the real sense, though of course its younger members belonged to the Armed Forces during the War. The SA commanding staff as such lackad every characteristic of military leadership. The SA could not even be considered no a police organization. When, during the War, it was considered using it for air raid protection and police tasks, it was ultimately considered inadequate as an organization and individual men were detached to the air raid protection organizations directed by the police (for rescue stations, clearing away rubble etc.).

In view of the facts stated above, the term of "criminal organization"

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cannot possibly be applied wholesale to the SA as a corporate body, and still less to the individual. What has been said above for the SA also applies in many respects to other accused organizations. When, for instance riding and motoring societies were incorporated as a body into the SS cavalry, the NSKK, it was, from that time on, their only possibility of engaging in sport at all, and it would in any case be misleading to attempt to draw any conclusions from this on political motives.

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To conclude these considerations, let me add the following general facts in answer to the charge of collective guilt:

Establishment of a collective guilt without investigation of the crime in each particular case is contrary to the sense of justice of democratic nations.

It has been reserved for National Socialism to construct the collective guilt of a community or of a whole race out of the offences of their individual members in contradiction to the legal concepts of the entire civilized world. The individual must have committed a punishable action or participated in it. And it is, as stated on 7. 11. 45 at Lueneburg by Professor SMITH, professor of International Law at the University of London, "a fundamental principle of law that a Tribunal cannot punish a man for an act which was not subject to punishment at the time it was committed". A wholesale incrimination of all members of major organizations, like the SA for instance, would in my opinion, be contrary to justice, as well as to political wisdom. The individuals concerned, who for a large part prepared for positive reconstruction on the side of the allies and who represent a reliable, indispensable and efficient potential, would be driven, in a fit of desperate resignation, into fresh radical currents and indeed, to nihilism. Many, particularly the young, who now feel that they have been deluded and deceived by their former National Socialist leaders and are beginning to believe in the proclaimed principle of justice and law against force, would lose faith in justice and inwardly revert to belief in the domination of force and to Nazism.

signed Dr. MENGE

s/ Dr. Arthur MENGE

I certify the above signature is that of
Dr. Arthur MENGE signed before me this
day of 21 May 1946

s/ S.A. BINDER
Capt. Inf.
6850 ISD IMT

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Oberbuergermeister

Dr. MENGE

Nuernberg 21 May 1946

Contains three enclosures

To the International Military Tribunal

in Nuernberg.

I enclose

I Annex I"Reflections on the Nuernberg Indictment"

II Annex II Excerpt of a letter accompanying these reflections which I wrote to the Secretary General of the International Military Tribunal on 27 November 1945.

In connection with the information given in these enclosures I add the following statements:

1) Prior to and also during the first period after the seizure of power the Christian attitude of the SA was stressed repeatedly:

a) Thus I was told by General D. MUFF who is now residing in Haemelschenburg near Hameln and who was in 1931 senior garrison officer in Ludwigsburg in Wuerttemberg, that the highest SA leader there asked him if the SA might participate as a body in the Sunday divine services in the garrison church.

b) In Hameln the SA entered the Hameln cathedral with their marching flags on 1 May 1933 and 1 May 1934.

c) In the late summer of 1933 an assembly of SA Standarte 164 (city of Hameln and Hameln-Pyrmont district) took place

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in Bad Pyrmont, its culminating point was a divine field service on the Emmerwiesen, during which a Pyrmonter clergyman preached. (Publication of retired Regierungsbaurat BECHER of Hameln).

I believe, that the events described above are merely examples which can be multiplied further, if things are examined more closely.

2) The question of aggressive intentions of the SA.

a) The retired general named above MUFF and the present city councillor MUELLER of the city administration of Hameln have told me the following, which is worthy of belief: In November 1939?, after a hunting party in Fahrberg near Hannover, they met the then Chief of Staff of the SA, LUTZE. During this meeting he told them in a very passionate way about a conference which took place in August 1939 concerning the imminent war with Poland. HITLER and GOEBBELS were for the war, which they intended to conduct as a Blitzkrieg. LUTZE is supposed to have declared himself very energetically opposed to this war, the German people not being spiritually prepared for such a war, and that moreover a Blitzkrieg was out of the question. At this meeting retired Admiral STIEHINGER is supposed to have been present.

b) In due course the former commander of the Hannover cavalery school Hannover, retired General VOLK, informed me that an agreement was made between LUTZE and the then commander in chief of the army, General v. BRAUCHITSCH, that in case of a conflict between SS and the Wehrmacht, the SA would be on the side of the Wehrmacht.

3) Concerning the question, whether a normal person must, from a

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reasonable point of view, consider the SA as a criminal organization, that is an organization, of which it was known, that it served the political leadership as an instrument for the domination of Europe, and tried to attain this aim, possibly by the violent oppression of those who thought differently (terror), by breach of international treaties (wars of aggression), this question in generally answered to the negative among the circle of my acquaint This has been expressed to me, for example, by the Provincial Bishop of the Hanovrian provincial church, Marahnens, of Hanover the secretary of the occumenical council, Oberlandeskirchenrat Liljo, Hanover.

Pastor Mahner, Hanover, business leader of the denominational church in the Hanovrian provincial church, Hermann Schuster, Hanover, professor of theology at the university of Goettingen.and others.

The present President of the Chamber of Medical Doctors of Lower Satory, Dr. Siemens, Hanover, who was a well known opponent of the National Socialist regime, writs to me that it did not seem permissible to him to condemn categorically, in advance, the most widely different formations, and that he would like to warn against summarily condemning, the members of the SA in advance etc. as criminals.

At the time of the creation of the SA and SS cavalry companies (Reiter-stuerme), which as it seems, arose from sport clubs nobody knew of any unlawful, or much less, criminal, intentions on activities of these organizat The present President of the Agricultural Chamber and of the Provincial Food Office in Hanover, von Reden, writes to me

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that the approximately 280 - 300 rural riding clubs in the province of Hanover in 1933 were forcibly changed over to the SA Cavalry, newly established at that time, and thereby constituted the main body of this National Socialist Formation. Organizations, which were opposed to this change, were designated as "wild", their members no longer could participate in the riding and driving tournaments and in the championship fights. One joined the SA Cavalry out of enthusiasm and love for the riding and driving sports. The SA Cavalry could not be regarded as a political fighting organization. It was, above all, an organization of horsemen who also always strove for a separation from the SA.

From my own knowledge of the conditions in the SA Naval Units, I can prove the above attestation concerning the SA Cavalry. The so-called 4 naval divisions which were established in Hanover in the fall of 1933, included the water sportsmen who were organized in the Hanover rowing, yacht , canoe, paddling, and swimming clubs. The water sports club members joined the SA Naval Units under considerable pressure by the Party. Had they not joined, their boat houses, boats etc. would have been confiscated and the offical financial support, upon which they were dependant for the expenses of regattas, procurement of boats etc., would have been withdrawn. A watersport spirit and comradeship were the backbone of the SA Naval Units, the so-called old fighters were missing in it; the connection with the actual SA was a very loose one. The SA Naval Units were not regarded as a Party fighting organization and, in my opinion, no member of the SA Naval Units, in carrying out his duties, would have thought of serving the preparations for a war of aggression.

When, after HITLER had been entrusted with the Reichchancellory, it became apparent in the course of the year that weapons were being manufactu to a certain extent - only very late, if at all, did the German people lear of the tremendous extent of the German armament - HITLER, through the press and whispered propaganda, was systematically presented to the German people as an angel of peace, who had been in the world war himself for 4 years, knew all the horrors of war, and who would guard the German people from the sufferings of a new war. This devilish propaganda was generally believed i Germany. As a matter of fact, it really was difficult to believe that after the endless suffering and horrors, which the First World War had brought upon humanity, such an unscrupulous criminal could be found who would again unleash a war. In my opinion - with the exception of a few statemen - this was also not believed abroad! Otherwise the German armament, which at that time could easily have been prevented, would not have been tolerated.

I also wish to state that my conscience has forced me to make these statements in order to avoid "further injustice" and "political mistakes" I belonged neither to the Party nor to any SA formation. On the contrary, as the deceased burgomaster MUELLER of Hanover had stated on due occasion, in 1933 I was several times in danger of being arrested by lesser numbers of the SA! These arrests were prevented on the part of the higher SA.

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I, Enclosure 3

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I verify in lieu of oath the correctness of the statements made by me in this petition and in the three enclosures. As attorney, I am aware of the consequences of an incorrect statement in lieu of oath.

Nuernberg, 21 May 1948

s/ARTHUR WENGE

former burgomaster of Hanover and

member of the Reich Council of the

German Republic.

I certify that the above signature is that of Dr. ARTHUR WENGE signed before me this day of 21 May 1948

s/ S.H. BENDER

Capt. Inf.

6850 ISD IMT

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CIE 91 Darmstadt

16 June 1946

Affidavit

I, the undersigned, B L O M E (Name) K U R T (Christian name)

Int. No. 31 G. 5173069, profession: Prof. Dr. med., last residence: Munich, Mottlstr.
being informed of the meaning of an affidavit, declare in a sworn statement in lieu of oath the following:

I am conversant with the fact that the making of a false sworn statement in lieu of oath is punishable and that this affidavit will be exhibited at the I.M.T. in Nuernberg.

Re subject:

I know the former SA Chief of Staff Victor LUTZE from the SA, to which I belonged since 1931. I was last the medical local leader at the disposal of Supreme SA Command. Although this position had no connection with the duties of the SA I often met Staff Chief LUTZE, so that I had good comradely relations to LUTZE. These meetings were mostly short and casual, but during the war in 1940, on the occasion of an incidental common journey in the sleeper Berlin-Munich, or vice versa, we had the opportunity to indulge in a lengthy intimate discussion. From this meeting I recall chiefly 2 points of conversation:

1) The general situation,

2) The events of 8 /9 November 1938.

Re 1. Chief of Staff LUTZE complained of the general political development, especially of the fact that, from his point of view, a gradual distinction had developed between the true national socialism as it was represented during the fighting period and in the party programme, and the present regime which he called "Nazism". As the essential feature of the latter he mentioned the suppression of every individuality and every honest expression of opinion. From the desired national socialist people's state had arisen an intolerant Police State. He talked about a general complete "uniformity" not only in outward visible forms but also in the intellectual sphere. The world would have reconciled itself with the old, decent national socialism; Nazism, however, had brought upon us the hate

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of all. If a basic change is not made here, a gloomy future awaits us. He himself was sorry for most of the men of the SA, who had been deeply disappointed by the course of the development. LUTZE expressed himself to me similarly on the occasion of my visit to him in Berlin Vosstrasse, about February 1941.

When in 1942 I congratulated Chief of Staff LUTZE on his 50th birthday in his apartment in Berlin, he took me aside, lead me into one of the rooms and said to me almost literally the following:

"Last night the Fuehrer was here in order to congratulate me. There (he pointed to a seat) we two sat alone for more than 2 hours. I told the Fuehrer frankly all my worries and misgivings. He promised me he would do all he can to provide for a change."

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He, LUTZE, then expressed his joy on the Fuehrer's promise. Now he hoped to be able to inspire the SA, for years treated like a step-child, with new buoyancy in the old traditional sense.

Re 2:

On this point LUTZE talked to me in an outspoken lively manner. He had known nothing of the matter, otherwise he would have prevented it. I believe he mentioned Dr. GOEBBELS to me as the instigator. By this the SA, quite unjustly, was put in an unfavorable light, which, considering its decent basic motives, it did not deserve. If SA men really took part in it, it was due to their thoughtlessness and the imposition of orders which had not been issued by him. Wherever he, LUTZE, turned up, great disappointment was shown about these events.

s/ Prof. Dr. Kurt BLOME.

(Prof. Dr. KURT BLOME)

I certify above true signature
as witness.
Darmstadt, 18. 6. 1946

s/ Victor POUH(?) Civ.
326 HID

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Dr. ASCHENAUER
Defense Counsel for the SA

Willy NEY

Nuernberg, 22. 6. 1946.

Affirmation in lieu of oath.

After having been informed of the penal consequences of a false affidavit, I state as follows in lieu of oath for submission to the International Military Tribunal at Nuernberg.

Personal matter: My name is Willy NEY, born on 10.8.1893 at Schertendorf District Gruenberg in Silesia. I was a SA-Fuehrer in Standarte 4, finally Fuehrer of this Standarte with the rank of a SA-Obersturmbannfuehrer.

Matter relevant:

1. SA-members of Standarte 4 in Berlin did not receive orders to participate in excesses in November 1938.
2. On the contrary the Head Office ordered us to see that under no circumstances should SA-members participate in excesses. This occurred.
3. According to reports of the units, members of Standarte 4 did not participate in excesses.
4. On my way from my office to the business office of the Standarte I could confirm, together with the SA-Oberfuehrer MENDE - Fuehrer of Standarte 4, that civilians were conspicuously busy at the shopwindows in the streets of the inner town of Berlin and fled when they saw us. These people gave us the impression of being anti-social elements who, according to experience, do dirty business when the slightest occasion arises.
5. I repeatedly heard from people that foreign elements were concerned in these excesses.
6. I learnt through the SA-Fuehrers of the Standarten 5, 10 and 12 in Berlin that members of these units were not concerned in the excesses.

s/ WILLY NEY

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Subscribed and sworn to before me this

.....24.....day of June 1946

s/ ROBERT B. STARNES
0-1334763
1 St At Inf.
Lt.

J, PAUL SCHMIDT, fully conversant with the English and German languages, testify that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

s/ Dr. PAUL SCHMIDT.

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GEORG ZELNHEFER

No. 6 - 2238

Camp Moosburg.

A F F I D A V I T.

I make the following statement under oath, to be presented at th International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg, after I have been instruc about the penal consequences of a false affidavit:

Datas concerning the person:

GEORG ZELNHEFER, born on 24 January 1908 in Nuernberg, in the SA from 1932 until 1945, former referent for organization and its divisions, for construction of SA settlements and problems concer ing Reich Party Days in the Staff of the SA Group Frankonia. At the present time Civil. Internment Camp 6, Moosburg.

Relevant material:

In the year 1939 I worked in the Deployment Staff (Aufmarschstab) for the Reich Party Day. Due to the various incidents on the Polish border the rumor of an imminent war was circulated. In th period between 15 and 25 August (I do not recall the exact date anymore) Dr. ROBERT LEY appeared and called the chief workers i this matter together for a discussion. Asked by us whether in vi of the foreign political situation there was any sense whatsoever to continue to work, LEY said that he just came from the Fuehrer and had the order for us that the Reich Party Day had to take pla under all circumstances. The Fuehrer was in no respect thinking of war, but quite the contrary, was ready to do everything to pre the peace for Germany.

Civil.Internment Camp 6
Moosburg, 29 April 1946

s/ GEORG ZELNHEFER

The above signature has been made before me after I was shown th papers and is hereby certified by me:

(Illegible signature)

8 May 1946

I certify that to the best of my knowledge, the above signature is that of the party who signed in my presence.

(Illegible signature)

Assistant of the Defense Counsel of the SA, GEORG BOEHM.

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I attest the signature of Dr. ZWINGMANN, Interned Buergermeister of Civilian Internment Camp No. 6. (sic).

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~~B~~ 7

Georg MAPPES
Prisoner No. 2426 - B 15

Internment Camp 78

I have been informed as to the consequences of a false declaration in lieu of oath, and I know that the following declaration is being made for submission to the International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg in Court proceedings against the SA of the NSDAP as an organization. According to the best of my knowledge and in good conscience I make the following declaration in lieu of oath:

A. - Personal Career.

I was born in Karlsruhe/Baden on 24 July 1900 as the son of Georg MAPPES, independant merchant. After attending the Realschule (school with 6 grades - 10 to 16) and, later, Oberrealschule (school with 9 grades) until the first class, I volunteered for military service in 1917 and served as a gunner throughout the First World War, until the end.

I then entered my father's business (office machines and sewing machines) as a apprentice. In 1921 I became a senior clerk and co-proprietor of this business. During the time of my apprenticeship I worked every year for several months in factories, as an volunteer, in order to increase my experience. Our business was doing well, even after stabilization of the currency in 1924. In 1933 I worked as a volunteer for the firm of Pfaff at Kaiserslautern, and was subsequently employed by that firm as manager of their branches at Solingen and Remscheid, still continuing as partner in my father's business. Economically, my position was very satisfactory. On an average my monthly earnings amounted to from 600 to 1,000 marks during the years 1928 to 1937. In October 1938 I resigned from my position with the firm of Pfaff. The reasons for this, as well as for withdrawing from my father's business which occurred in 19[illegible], are explained furtherons.

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After having attended a National Socialist meeting in Munich in 1927, I came to the conclusion that this party would reach this goal, and that is why I joined in October, 1928.

At that time the organization of the Party was such that almost every Party member was also an SA man. When considering the tasks assigned to the SA at that time, there should be differentiation between the SA service, strictly speaking, and the use of the SA for Party purposes. Directives and orders to the SA service properly speaking came from the Supreme SA Leadership in Munich to the SA Gau Leaders who, in turn, passed them on to the SA units under their jurisdiction. In those days the ordinary SA service was not efficiently organized, the SA activities consisted mainly in marching in propaganda marches, forming cordons during party affairs; providing protection for speakers during meetings, making and putting up posters etc. The SA was not excluded from information regarding the aims of the NSDAP; information and indoctrination were made part of Party gatherings. These goals were all laid down in the NSDAP program, that is known.

The goal to be reached was the taking over of power in Germany. As was emphasized in innumerable gatherings by leaders of the Party, this taking over of power was to come about in a legal way. The legal way was to obtain so many votes in the elections, that by reason of a majority of votes, governmental power would be transferred on the basis of the democratic Weimar constitution. From this it followed that special attention was to be devoted to elections and election propaganda.

As already emphasized , the special tasks assigned to the SA consisted in marching, distributing leaflets and handbills, and providing protection during meetings. This special task of safeguarding had become necessary because political opponents had disturbed numerous meetings not only through shouting but also through violence, and had even broken them up. The SA, on the other hand,was merely intended to serve as a protective measure, which means it entered into action only when disturbances occurred through opposing parties. The Fuehrer demanded that repeatedly and emphatically.

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In that connection the Fuehrer also forbade explicitly the carrying of weapons by the SA. There also existed an instruction, given by the Supreme SA Leadership, which pledged the Sturmfuehrer to search their men for weapons before every meeting. I have myself carried out this instruction at a number of meetings. Whenever disturbances occurred in meetings or in the course of other legitimate propaganda activity - for instance during propaganda marches or the distribution of handbills, they naturally were put an end to, but without the use of force.

In election speeches and other propaganda activities of the Party, the Treaty of Versailles played naturally an important part. Already in the years after 1920 - especially after the inflation - it had become manifest that it was impossible to carry out the Treaty of Versailles in its original form. This was also known to the ex-enemy powers; the USA had never ratified the Treaty of Versailles; and moreover several new agreements had been concluded which made essential provisions of the Treaty of Versailles obsolete; as, for instance, the YOUNG Plan, the DAWES Plan and the LOCARNO Agreement. Germany's continued economic decline, and its effects on the world economic situation as a whole, showed that these changes constituted merely unsatisfactory partial solutions. That is why all parties in Germany demanded to a greater or lesser degree a fundamental revision of the Treaty. In that respect

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the NSDAP differed little from numerous other German parties which were also influential. On the other hand, the NSDAP took the stand that the German governments of that time did not represent these basic conceptions energetically enough in their negotiations, or conferences, with enemy powers. From this it follows that the fight against the Treaty of Versailles which the NSDAP had made part of its program, was in the first instance a fight against the German governments which had proved too weak. The NSDAP took the point of view that this weakness arose from the fact that these governments were backed by numerous smaller and larger parties and by other powerful groups; frequent changes therefore became necessary, which made a clear, uniform line in the pursuit of that goal impossible. That is why it was the aim of the NSDAP to come to power in a legitimate manner, through a majority of votes, and thus to form a government capable of doing successful work. This government was expected to bring about fundamental revisions of the Treaty of Versailles also in a legitimate manner through negotiations with the respective powers. It is therefore an absurdity to hold that any SA man thought, or could have thought, that after assumption of power through the NSDAP, a revision of the Treaty of Versailles would have to be obtained by force.

It is my opinion, and also that of the Party, that one of the principal causes for Germany's economic plight derived from the fact that through the Treaty of Versailles we were deprived of exploitation of former areas of raw materials in the colonies. Germany was poor in raw materials and could not recuperate without new raw materials. That is why, within the framework of its fight against the Treaty of Versailles, the Party also endorsed the demand for restitution of the former German colonies, all the more so as according to the Treaty they had been assigned to other powers temporarily only, as mandates. It goes without saying that in this respect also nobody thought of reconquering the colonies by force of arms. I have never been informed of a provision or the setting of a Party goal, according to which European countries were to be attached to, or incorporated into, the German Reich by force of arms. Personally I was of the opinion that a great

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contribution would be made to the economic prosperity of the world if customs boundaries between individual States could be eliminated. I am of the opinion that a great portion of the Party shared that opinion.

As regards innerpolitical affairs the NSDAP carried on warfare against the parties in the manner already referred to.

At that time, there was no tension between the Catholic or Evangelical Church. On the contrary, numerous Catholic and Evangelical clergymen were active and useful members of the Party lending their support wholeheartedly, particularly in the fight against Communism. In this connection I should like to refer to a rather sensational pamphlet written by the Catholic priest Senn, of Sickingen/Baden, which won the approval of the widest circles in Baden. The SA was not antagonistic towards the Church; I knew that in several localities SA units were marched to Church services.

The attitude of the Party and, consequently of the SA to the Jewish question is known; essentially it also corresponded with my own opinion. For the SA it was a foregone conclusion that the elimination of Jewish influence, which had been too preponderant in the fields of public, economic and cultural matters, would be brought about in a legitimate manner.

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I do not know whether already at that time an elimination of trade unions had been demanded. In any case, the question of trade unions played no part in the SA.

On the other hand, one of the most important points on the NSDAP program was not only to strive for improvement of the workers' economic position but also to safeguard his right to work and due respect for work. Just because these demands were so zealously fought for numerous workmen who formerly had belonged to the SPD or to the KPD flocked to the Party and to the SA.

Moreover, the SA embodied the much-desired great racial community. In it the ordinary worker was linked in fellowship with the academician, the city dweller with the people living in the country, and the Protestant with the Catholic.

C.- Assumption of Power by 30 June 1934

I myself witnessed the taking over of power in 1933 in Duesseldorf when I was already employed by the firm of Pfaff. At that time I did not serve actively in the SA. I was merely an honorary member of the Group Detachment Baden, as Standartenfuehrer (about equivalent to Colonel in the Army). It goes without saying that I welcomed the election results which brought us the majority of votes, and with it the legal assumption of power. The taking over of power in Duesseldorf and vicinity took place without friction. Cases of excesses against Jews or political opponents did not come to my attention although one should bear in mind the fact that particularly in the Rhine-Ruhr section the SA had suffered considerably because of the violent measures previously taken there by political opponents. It is natural that as a result of the taking over of power considerable contingents joined the SA from all political camps. In the Duesseldorf region, for example, many Stahlhelm member joined the SA immediately after the assumption

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of power. In addition, great numbers of workers who until then were in favor of Communism or Social-Democracy, joined the SA hoping for the most part that membership in the SA would help them find work more readily. The task of the SA did not change. Where here and there SA men were used in Police service, these men were removed to the Police; they were on their payroll and, where necessary, they were also supplied with arms by the Police. The SA had nothing to do with the assignment of these to the Police. A great number of these men remained with the Police and were taken over by it or by offices of Home Administration. In general, the old ban against the carrying of arms continued to remain in effect for the SA.

As a result of the very considerable numerical growth, – which increased the total SA strength to 3.5 – 4 million men, constant reorganizing became necessary. As another result of this sudden growth an effective service organization was hardly possible in the SA for a long time.

It did not take long, however, for Roehm, – at that time the Chief of Staff (Stabschef) – to introduce order in this field. The SA service regulation, the SA clothing regulation, disciplinary regulations and so on, for example, were issued at that time: but nothing changed in the fundamental task of the SA; it was centered predominantly in the social field, as will be described later on.

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Technical units of SA, which had begun to appear here and there, were at that time also organized; for example the motorized SA, SA units on horseback, medical service units. The idea in forming these special units was to win over men who had special love for technical matters, for horses, or for medical service for the type of service which suited them particularly and to foster their love for the service.

Chief of Staff Roehm placed the relationship with the political leadership on a different basis. This became necessary because individual leaders of high political rank tried to build up SA Gau units of their own and to place them under their exclusive jurisdiction. Roehm was very much opposed to such aspirations and in time he also was successful in preventing formation of such Gau units.

On the other hand, the Party and the Supreme SA Leadership issued numerous orders, directives, and suggestions intended to bring about by all means the economic rise which the program had promised. Individual members of the SA were over and over again advised in evening training courses to do their own buying to have repairs done, and so on, to help priming economy again. It did not take long for this proganda to show results because not only did it become possible to give work to a consiberable number of SA men thus far unemployed, but also to give work to many unemployed men who had previously been political opponents. The SA leadership also gave special thought to work to people with different political ideas in order to win their cooperation.

SA had set itself the special task of fulfilling this purpose by establishing SA Auxiliary Working Camps which came into existance shortly after the taking over of power. I remember exactly that immediately after the assumption of power the SA Leadership emphatically demanded that the groups establish such camps. That is why when Group Leader Ludin congratulated me on my birthday anniversary, 24 July 1933 he pleaded with me to take over this task for the region of the Southwest (Wuerttemberg and Bavaria) Group because he did not have any other suitable man. Finally yielding to the repeated urgent requests of various SA Leaders, among them Brigadefuehrer Plesch, Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow, and also Chief of Staff

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Roehm, I accepted the assignment of Gruppengeldverwalter (Group Finance Administrator) in October 1933, with headquarters in Stuttgart and took over the creation of relief camps within the region of the Group as full-time activity.

These Auxiliary Working camps were expected to admit SA men who were out of work and, where necessary, to supply them with underwear, to refresh them (because many of them were undernourished) and to obtain work for them. At that time I had under my orders a technician whose exclusive task it was to be in contact with labor offices and have them direct the SA men to the camps. In these camps SA men also benefitted along professional lines, for instance, through work in small work shops. In addition to this, I succeeded in arranging with trade schools in the vicinity the introduction of special courses for these men.

On the basis of that assignment I established between 1933 and the middle of 1934 the following Auxiliary Working camps: Villingen, Gammertingen, Stuttgart, Isny, Sigmaringen. Each camp accommodated 300 men in round figures; admission was on the average granted for 6 to 8 weeks. Wooded structures were in part available and to some extent, were placed at our disposal by communities free of charge; in Stuttgart, for example they were erected exclusively from SA funds.

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with subsidies granted by the town. During the first year of my activity with Group I South-West, expended 3 million Reichsmark, in round figures for such purposes. The best part of these funds was remitted by the senior SA leadership for these purposes.

The SA social-welfare work, however did not end with such Auxiliary Working camps; we helped wherever necessary. I know - to give an example that with the consent of Group Leader Ludin I distributed at Christmas 1933 underwear, socks, and boots which cost 100,000 Reichsmarks, in round figures. Sometime in the spring of 1934, the SA Supreme Leadership introduced the Adolf HITLER Fund, for the creation of free board and lodging. The populati was asked to provide free board and lodging for SA men in need of a change. This found ample response within my field of activity and great numbers of SA men from all parts of the Reich obtained in that manner an opportunity for a needed change. In addition, we supplied these men with daily pocket money of RM 1.- which was obtained through voluntary contribution within the SA. The SA devoted special attention to matters pertaining to public health As a beginning, I established an SA Medical School in Tuebingen Castle, wher men were receiving instruction in medical, and public health service, to permit their giving first aid in cases of accidents. Under the direction of medical men and professors from Tuebingen, the school was much sought after, so that I decided in 1934 to erect a new structure in Tuebingen and in the beginning of 1935 it was used by the Supreme SA Leadership as the Reich Medical School of the SA. Finally all the SA men were also periodically examined by SA physicians, particularly to combat tuberculosis of the lungs, a very common affliction at that time. Whenever serious diseases were confirmed in regard to SA men or their families, we contacted the competent public health agencies and saw to it that the sick persons were taken to hospitals or were otherwise given such care as the situation required.

During that time I observed no religious tension. I myself was married early in August 1934, in church, in uniform. Several high ranking SA comrades attended the ceremony. The SA Leadership, in any case, did not issue any orders which were in any way aimed against the Church, or reflected animosity to the Church. The German Christian movement did not

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play any important part in the SA. It also never came to my attention that within the SA there had been opposition because of differing religious views. Comradeship continued to predominate in the SA.

Settlement of the Jewish question was a matter for the State. I am of the opinion that it is entirely out of the question that the SA would have interfered in any form in this domain reserved to the State or even that it would have made suggestions for settling the Jewish question. I cannot remember any excesses against Jews within my Group area, and I certainly would remember them if they had been of any importance. It goes without saying that SA men were expected to observe the greatest reserve in their dealings with Jews; as an example, they were not to buy in Jewish business establishments.

After the assumption of power, and especially after the dissolution of the other political parties, political campaigning against people endorsing other views had lost all purpose, at least within my Group. As already emphasized, the SA now saw its primary task in winning the outsiders through deeds, in other words through the social-welfare measures already discussed.

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The dissolution of the parties came about without the exertion of any influence by the SA as an entity. Should it happen, here or there, that SA members were used to fill certain positions in other parties, they were not assigned as SA members but as auxiliary police. In so far as the property of dissolved parties was confiscated, the SA did not benefit directly by it. Whenever the SA desired to have the use of recration grounds or of recreational establishments, and so on, I - and this applies at least to my Group area - made the proper arrangements with the competent authoritie

As far as I know, the SA had nothing to do with the establishment of concentration camps -- at least not within my group area. It is therefore also impossible that the SA could have been used for guard service in that field.

In the beginning of 1934 the question of taking over the Stahlhelm (steelhelmet) into the SA became acute. The Supreme SA Leadership issued orders on the manner in which this transfer was to come about. The necessary negotiations were to be carried on by the SA Group Leaders with the respective Stahlhelm leaders. These negotiations lasted for months and the final result was that the greater part of the Stahlhelm was transferred to the SA Reserve, and a smaller portion to the general SA. I am not in a position to state whether any pressure or compulsion was used by the Stahlhelm in connection with the transfer. In my Group area, also, no other formations were transferred to the SA as a whole.

It has already been stressed that as a result of the great number of new members reorganization had also become necessary. This is how it came about that the SA service strictly speaking - which heretofore centered primarily in the protection of meetings, - was placed on a new basis. In that respect the SA members physical improvement through sports was placed into the foreground. This physical training formed a very essential part of the social progran of the SA, because the physical condition of the SA men was largely unsatisfactory. Open air physical exercise was expected to

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and could help to improve this.

For that reason the SA Sports Badge was created: requirements for its award are known. In addition, it also became necessary to educate the SA men so as to assure their statisfactory and appropriate behavior in their contacts with other people. This also brought about the temporary ban on smoking in the street for the man in uniform. Great attention was also paid to decent and neat clothing. The SA had no military duties, all the more so as it had no arms at its disposal outside of those which, on the assumtpion of power, might have been temporarily in the possession of the SA from confiscated weapons of the KPD and SPD. It is true that at that time the Reichswehr established so-called Chef-AW-Lager. Upon agreement between the Supreme SA Leadership and the Reichswehr, SA made SA men and leaders available for brief instruction courses, but enlistment was on a voluntary basis. Direction of this entire organization was in the hands of Krueger, at that time SA Group Leader. I recall a Group-Leader rally, in the spring of 1934 at Hotel Elizabeth on the Starnberg See, on which occasion several Group Leaders complained to Chief of Staff Roehm that these camps not only were not under the jurisdiction of local group leaders but

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it was not even possible to have an influence ever such camps.

In all other respects considerable value was attributed to keeping the SA decent. For example, all SA members who had beenmpunished or were being punished because of dishonorable offenses, were excluded from the SA. In addition, SA jurisdiction was also introduced, so as to requite infractions agginst the internal descipline and order of the SA.

The SA had nothing to do with the dissolution of the trade unions; in any case I know nothing about it.

D.- 30 June 1934, until the outbreak of the war.

The events which led up to 30 June 1934 are not quite clear to me. The immediate result of events in Munich was firstly that the operations of the S. were severely curtailed, particularly as part of its former leadership had been shot and part removed from their positions. Then followed the Fuehrer's decree on decency and simplicity within the entire Party. I heartily welcomed this decree, which had at all times found application within my Group. A review of administrative affairs was also carried out in my Group area, but no cases of complaint occurred within my Group. I believe that this may be th reason why I was appointed Administrative Chief of the Supreme SA Leadership in Munich, in October 1934. There I made the acquaintance of Chief-of-Staff LUTZE, who so far was known to me by name only, and Reich Treasurer Schwarz who initiated me into new duties. They consisted in the creation of a well-ordered and decent administrative system for the SA, the settlement of its debts and/at the same time the taking of the necessary steps to keep undesirable and unreliable elements out of the Leadership Corps. Following an order given him, Chief-of-Staff LUTZE had at that time already demanded that the SA should be cut down to a maximum of 1-1/2 million men and the elimination of all men from SA who for one reason or another might be a burden to it.

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Already some time previously, the SS and the NSKK (National Socialist Motor Corps) had become independent organizations by reason of the Fuehrer's order, and the SA had to supply them with many of their men. Important tasks were assigned to the SS and NSKK by the Fuehrer while, after 30 June 1934, the SA was completely relegated to the background. SA men were now awaiting a declaration by the Fuehrer regarding the events which led up to 30 June 1934, because through the measures then taken they themselves felt outlawed. When such a declaration by the Fuehrer failed to materialise, the effect on the SA service was that numerous men stayed away from their duties, which meant automatically their resignation.

Through renewal of the SA Sports Badge in 1935 - which the SA was charged to carry out -- this duty assumed still greater importance.

Following the Fuehrer's order, I had in the meantime given instructions for a thorough checkup of all full-time SA Leaders as to their personal desirability. Through brief instructional courses, held in the Reich Leader School, these leaders were also tested for their leader qualifications from the viewpoint of character, physical condition and intellectual ability. For the carrying out of my checkup, I followed these rules:

a) statement as to indebtenes; to be made out yearly;

b) submission of a political certificate of good conduct and an extract from the penal register. I had the right to ask for extracts from the penal register.

c) later on its became necessary to submit possible divorce records, so as to establish whether the respective SA leader's moral conduct was in any way objectionable.

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By reason of this action several SA leaders were forced to resign from their full-time activities, or to resign altogether from the SA. Those who had distinguished themselves through services rendered to the movement were placed elsewhere whenever possible, with the help of the SA.

About the same time I succeeded in prevailing upon Schwarz, the Reich Treasurer, to consent to the creation of an SA Administrative Leader Corps which had been approved by the Fuehrer - and to have it placed under my personal supervision. I wished to safeguard thereby the decency demanded of the SA, which I succeeded in doing, particularly because I ordered the meting out of severe punishment, by legislative and disciplinary action, for all infractions, irrespe of position or rank. Especially during the first years of my activity I brought about quite a series of Court proceedings against SA Leaders guilty of embezzlem In those instances the culprits were expelled from the SA without regard for ran or position, In addition to that quite a number of Leaders were thrown out who not guilty of embezzlement but of negligence and of infractions of administrativ regulations. Upon request of the Supreme SA Leadership, Prosecuting Authorities and Courts of Law were also obliged, from that time on, to inform the SA Leaders of each penal sentence at least.

I also took steps so that all contracts which had been concluded by SA offices before I took office were checked and placed upon economically sound bas with due consideration of legal regulations.

My special attention was devoted to the further extension of the SA Auxiliary Working camps concerning which I had already had excellent experience in Gr Southwest. I brought about the creation of approximately 78 such camps throughou Germany. Their aims were not changed. Through enlarging the extent of these camp further training workshops were provided, under the direction of experts, and SA men could even take their journeyman's test there.

In view of the improvement of the economic situation by 1936-1937 w attendant scarcity of labor, and since there no longer existed a need for such I gradually closed all these relief camps except for two. This definitely prove that these camps served purely social welfare purposes and no other military ai

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I kept in two camps where foreign-born Germans - who at that time returned in great numbers from almost all countries - were given retraining according to the same principles, thus preparing them for earning their livelihood.

In this connection I should refer to the following fact: After the abortive Dollfuss Plot in 1934 Austrian National Socialists, some of them armed, crossed the German border in great numbers flocking particularly into Bavaria. Upon the Fuehrer's order these units were disarmed and the SA was assigned the task of housing these fugitives in camps located at a distance of at least 500 kilometers from the Austrian frontier. I established these camps on the Lower Rhine. The fugitives were retrained in these camps, and work was provided for them through these camps. The Fuehrer's order explicitly prohibited their returning to Austria. The Fuehrer also had ordered every fugitive who attempted to cross the Austrian border armed to be shot. These camps were also called Auxiliary Working Camps. These Camps also served no special purpose.

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These camps had nothing to do with Chief AW Camp. As a matter of fact, the camps of Chief AW were dissolved after 30 June by a Fuehrer order. This development was strictly the concern of the Reichswehr. These camps had at no time been of appreciable importance; they were still in course of construction.

Incidental to the Fuehrer's birthday in 1936, I started a drive for fund within the SA; the purpose was to make a considerable amount of money available to the Fuehrer for the creation of settlement of various kinds. The drive yielded between 12 and 13 million Reichsmarks which were turned over to the Fuehrer on 20 April 1936. The putting of this plan into practice along the lines as proposed by us, was assigned by the Fuehrer to the SA, and thus to me. In the years then following, numerous settlements were created in all parts of Germany through these funds which were replenished through new drives each successive year. The total number of such settlements was about 2,000. All kinds of settlements were considered, such as settlements at the outskirts of cities - Leipzig and Munich - newly created farms in Pomerania, and, finally, a whole series of community-settlements near Gleiwitz. The local SA units contributed generously to the creation of these settlements by voluntary work.

In the selection of settlers consideration was given not only to SA members or Party members, but at least 30 to 40% also included other racial comrades, particularly families with numerous children and war veterans whose income - depending upon the number of children - was not to exceed 300 Reichsmark per month. These settlements were deeded to the settlers as their property, after a probation period of two years. The debts on the settlements were kept as low as possible; provisions for amortization also were as generous as possible. Funds from this drive were also used to assist young farmers who through no fault of their own - for instance through epidemics or through floods - were in need.

A rather considerable sum of money was also turned over every year to the German Life-Saving Society.

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25 trucks with X-ray equipment were made available throughout Germany for X-ray examination; this equipment was bought by the SA.

Finally, the free-board contribution also continued to operate; my activity did not cover this field, and I also had no influence on the drive for children evacuation; I do know, however, that measures of that kind were wholeheartedly supported by the SA.

Immediately after taking over my central offices in Munich, I started work on the reorganization of the SA administration into a uniform body from entirely new angles, not following Wehrmacht instructions which I considered extreme, obsolete and impractical for our needs. My endeavor was to create an administration as simple and as comprehensive as possible. These ideas were reflected in the administrative instructions which I issued, regulations pertaining to salary, travel expenses and cost of removal; regulations governing leases and tenures, regulations governing purchase contracts, and so forth. To enforce these regulations a special administrative inspectorship office was established in Munich; in addition the offices were inspected by the Reich Auditing Office, an Agency of the Reich Treasurer. By the end of 1934 the total monthly SA budget amounted to 5 to 6 million Reichsmarks, a somewhat modest sum when considering the membership body previously mentioned, and not sufficient to cover preparation for war.

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With the approval of the Reich Treasurer I refused to make grants of money from SA funds to SA Leaders for special purposes. Only on special occasions, such as 50th birthdays, silver weddings and Christmas, special honorary gifts were presented in the name of the Chief-of-Staff. These honorary gifts always consisted of books, personal photographs with autographs, etc. The value of such gifts did not exceed 100 to 150 Reichsmark. Incidental to the 50th birthday anniversary of Chief-of-Staff LUTZE and Chief-of-Staff SCHEPMANN a birthday present was offered by Group Leaders the expense of which had been covered through voluntary contributions. The cost of these presents amounted to from five thousand to seven thousand Reichsmark. On the other hand, and also in agreement with the Reich Treasurer, I gave orders that without my approval the SA was not permitted to accept contributions of any kind and from anybody. I turned down such requests on principle. In cases where funds or material of value had already reached the SA, it was a general practice to turn them over to the NSV (National Socialist League for Public Welfare) to be used according to their discretion. I will not fail to mention that every cashier in the Group had every month to hand an official declaration to me, stating that no contributions had reached him. I therefore hoped to discourage embezzlement and opportunities for the SA to come under the influence of donators.

I should still add a few explanations relative to SA publications. The Supreme SA Leadership published the weekly paper "Der SA Mann" with a special group supplement; also the monthly publication "Der SA Fuehrer". The purpose of the paper "Der SA Mann" was to acquaint SA members with the work of their fellow comrades in other group areas, and thus to have a stimulating effect. Important political events were discussed therein. The editing of the "SA Mann" was in the hands of the SA Leader KOERBEL who, as far as I know was under the orders of LUTZE and therefore had his headquarters in Berlin.

Articles which appeared in "SA Mann" were contributions from the various groups sent to the press offices in Berlin. Their content gave repeated cause for controversies between the Central Office and the Adjutant of the Chief-of-Staff. It was in that connection and upon my request

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that KOERBEL relinquished his post. Moreover it should be remembered that the writers of these articles were inclined to present their work and the work of their units in a particularly favorable light. That is why accounts given in these articles very frequently are not in keeping with facts. Most likely, the wish was father to the thought. The paper was financially self-supporting. It remained in existence until 1942 when its publication was banned by the Fuehrer because he disapproved of its tendency.

The monthly publication "Der SA Fuehrer" was first supplied on subscription, but subsequently furnished free of charge to SA Leaders down to the rank of Sturmfuehrer. It served the intellectual training of the SA Leadership.

The effects of the events of 30 June 1934 deeply affected relations between the SA and the political leadership. This became evident from the fact that - to give an example - no local leaders of SA Gaus were asked to attend Gau leader meetings, or regional leaders' meetings. This gave cause to innumerable complaints made by groups to the Supreme SA Leadership. But cooperation between the Supreme SA Leadership and the Party Chancery was also so bad that the SA was frequently only informed subsequently of important Party meetings

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This is why in discussions with me the Chief-of-Staff often made reference to the impossible attitude of the Party Chancery and to the arrogant style of their letters. Obergruppenfuehrer JUETTNER repeatedly made the same complaint. I know that Chief-of-Staff LUTZE lodged frequent complaints with the Party Chancery though evidently with little success. This bad relationship between the SA and the Political Leadership was manifest throughout, down to the most subordinate offices.

All of these circumstances show that for the Party Leadership the SA had become a matter of very minor importance. Even Reich Treasure Schwarz and several of his colleagues told me this bluntly and repeatedly. At the same time, some of the Gau leaders supported by the Party Chancery constantly renewed their attempts to bring the SA men of their Gau under their control. Chief-of-Staff LUTZE protested vigorously against this, because he considered it incompatible with the purpose for which SA was formed. The Fuehrer too, disapproved of such schemes. This was probably one of the chief reasons why, from that time on, the SA was hardly ever asked for any more replacemtns. These bickerings also explained why there was little inclination on the part of the SA to carry out orders or instructions from the Political Leadership. There is therefore no ground for the claim that an intimate and close relationship existed between the SA and the Political Leadership.

There were no closer ties between SA and the other formations. Unfortunately, each organization went its own way.

Tension, which in the meantime arose between the Churches of both creeds fround little expression in the SA. There were leaders who took the stand that he only could become a SA Fuehrer of the Central Office who had left the Church. But on the other hand there was a far larger number of leaders who objected vigorously to this. I recall that incidental to a Group-Leaders' Rally orderd by the Fuehrer in 1935 or 1936, held on the Obersalzberg, and which was attentded by

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the Chief-of-Staff and all Group Leaders, the Fuehrer stated unequivocally thathe had no intention of abolishing the Churches or of introducing a new religion; and he forbade any pressure on members of the Party or SA members, to force them to separate from the Church. This basic order of the Fuehrer was thus brought to the knowledge of all Group Leaders and it never became known to me that - aside from unimportant individual incidents - higher SA Leaders would have violated this order.

I attended the Fuehrer Rally in the Old Townhall in Munich, on 9 November 1938. After conclusion of the official part of the program during the evening, and after the Fuehrer as well as part of the Leader Corps had already left the Hall, Dr. GOEBBELS stood up and said he had still to make a brief announcement. He stated that he had just been informed that Embassy Councillor von RATH had succumbed to his injuries, and that as a result of this news there had already occurred spontaneous manifestations against the Jews in two cities - I believe it was in Kassel and Halle-Merseburg. Dr. GOEBBELS further declared that for his Gau Berlin he had given his approval for a public demonstration to be held that same evening, whereupon several of the Leaders of the Party who were also present requested approval of similar demonstrations in their areas. GOEBBELS immediately gave his consent. Some of the Gau Leaders declared that this concerned the SA, and they tried

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to rope in the SA Leaders of the respective Gaus who were still present. [illegible] intervened immediately and protested against such an imputation, and he prohibited SA Leaders who were still present to permit participation of the SA in such demonstrations. Inasmuch as some of the SA Leaders had already left the Hall, the Chief-of-Staff gave me the order to proceed at once to Hotel Rheinhof where the SA Leaders were billeted and to transmit to them his strict order. I gathered the SA Leaders together in one of the small halls of Hotel Rheinhof and acquainted them with the order of the Chief-of-Staff. As far as I remember all the SA Leaders were then present. In other words, the Supreme SA Leadership explained clearly and unmistakably to the subordinate offices namely the Groups, all of which were represented, that the Highest SA Leadership prohibited participation.

I, of course, know that in some parts of Germany SA members participated nonetheless. It is my personal conviction that the explanation for this is that immediately after Goebbels had made his declaration, [illegible] Party Leaders - but none of the active SA Group Leaders - made telephone contact with their home offices and ordered the above mentioned demonstrations. The respective home offices then took steps to give the necessary instructions for the demonstrations, and naturally, in that connection they also informed home formations. In that manner it might have happened that here and there SA agencies might have been called upon by the Party, or by other formations or organizations, and given the order for the carrying out of the demonstrations in a manner which implied that orders for such demonstrations came from Munich. Events then occurred in part so rapidly that orders of the local SA Group Leaders - to the effect that participation by the SA was prohibited - arrived too late, all the more so as SA offices were no longer open in the evening. After news spread of what had happened in the course of the night and during the following day, the Fuehrer gave the order to the Chief-of-Staff to post immediately SA guards in uniform at all demolished business establishments so as to prevent pillaging. That order was carried out, and it is my opinion that

this accounts largely for the impression that the SA was responsible for this destruction.

A few days later I was in Berlin, calling on Chief-of-Staff LUTZE, who explained to me that the Fuehrer had stormed on account of the excesses. At that time I was present during a telephone conversation between the Chief-of-Staff and Dr. GOEBBELS, during which the Chief-of Staff reproached Dr. GOEBBELS, telling him that his declaration alone had set the entire matter going, and that he was trying to make the SA play the part of scapegoat. Dr. GOEBBELS tried to vindicate himself by saying that he had not given orders but that he had merely given instructions which affected his own Gau. Chief-of-Staff LUTZE protested vigorously against that interpretation and I remember very clearly my very deep indignation at this answer given by Dr. GOEBBELS.

From conversations with the head of the SA judiciary, I also remember that court proceedings were opened against SA members who had enriched themselves personally in connection with these excesses and most of which ended with the imposition of considerable terms of imprisonment, in consequenc of which the men were expelled from the SA. Altogether the impression prevailed in the SA - where the excesses met with disapproval - that the ultimate originator was Dr. GOEBBELS and that the SA members who participated as individuals had got into the mess through him and as a result of unfortunate circumstances. I remember that during one of the following Group Leader rallies Chief-of-Staff LUTZE,

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when he made mention of the events of 9 November, expressed the point of view, while at the same time he also expressed his severest displeasure to the Group Leaders in whose areas improper behaviour on the Part of SA men had occurred. The events of 9 November undoubtedly contributed further considerably to the SA's protest against being made use of by the Political Leadership.

The SA derived no financial benefits from these excesses. No money was made available to it from the sequestrated property.

Relationship with the Wehrmacht was friendly, especially after the reintroduction of the general draft act. The SA considered the reintroduction of compulsory military service as justified in view of the fact that the other signatories to the Treaty of Versailles not only failed to disarm but even to arm. continued

Sometime in 1938 a Fuehrer order assigned to the SA the task of pre-military and post-military training. Details for the execution of this order resulted in negotiations between the offices whom this order concerned lasting many months. Their final result was that pre-military training was to be handled by HJ (Hitler Youth), that SS and NSKK handled the training of their own men and that, practically speaking, the SA was to handle the training only of that which was left. The question of what this training was to consist of was a matter of concern to the leadership who, as far as I know, carried on deliberations for months until a result was finally reached. The militiamen (Wehrmannschaften) who were subsequently trained did not make their appearance for practical purposes at all. Immediately after the outbreak of the war a decree was issued suspending all work connected with the organization of this militia program until the end of the war and as a matter of fact, nothing had really been built up when the war broke out, not even the reorganization which had become necessary in connection with this program had been put into effect.

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The SA took no part in the entry of German troops into Austria. I know nothing whatsoever of preparations of any kind, which I should have known of had it been planned for the SA to participate in that invasion in any form whatsoever. I did not learn of that invasion until it was announced over the radio, while I was on a duty journey in Tuebingen, when all of a sudden the first radio announcements were made about the invasion. It is true that thereupon I was immediately ordered to Munich where I received the order to proceed to Vienna the following day, whereto a part of the SA Supreme Leadership had already preceded me. In Vienna I was ordered to organize the Austrian SA - which though previously illegal, had managed to exist without any financial assistance from the SA of the old Reich - according to the administrative principles approved by me. That order was carried out. Moreover, in this instance also I immediately directed my attention towards the improvement of social conditions-true to the calling and tradition of the SA - , submitting my proposals along such lines to the Chief-of-Staff and to the Fuehrer. To give an example of such activities: the creation of large-scale settlements in Vienna was initiated with the cooperation of Oberbuergermeister Neubacher; nine months later these buildings were ready for occupancy. I also took steps to have meals distributed to the needy population of Vienna and vicinity from the field kitchen, free of charge. The cost was covered out of SA funds. I also gave order to send large quantities of underwear, clothes, and so forth, from SA supplies in Germany to Austria where they were likewise distributed free of charge to needy people. This social welfare work was continued later on and it was considerably expanded.

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I also wish to stress that Austrian SA members quartered in the Auxiliary wording camps on the Lower Rhine wished to return to Austria immediately after the Anschluss. It was the Fuehrer's order, however, that they must two weeks and then only after they had been searched for weapons.

Immediately after the invasion SA Leaders from Germany (Altreich) were stationed in Austria for the purpose of initiating SA Austrian Leaders. These men were also tested at the SA Leader School, newly established in Vienna, with regard to their suitability. The same checkup-principles which had successfully found application in the Altreich were applied here also.

I will not fail to mention that the SA welcomed Austria's Anschluss. It was generally known in Germany that as far back as 1919 federated States such as Salzburg, Tyrol and Vorar[illegible]rg had in a plebiscite demanded by a 90 to 100 % majority that Austria join Germany. The Interallied Commission, however, did not permit this step. When I was in Austria, a few days after th invasion, I could myself confirm that this desire continued to exist throughout Austria as far as the majority of the population were concerned.

Late in the summer of 1938 German refuges from the Sudetenland arrived in the Altreich. I cannot say just how many there were, bacause personally I had nothing to do with the care for these men. I merely remember that one day - I do not remember whether it was before or after the Munich Pact - Obergruppenfuehrer JULTNER called me on the telephone. He informed me that he had been given the assignment of administering to the needs of refugees from the Sudetenland, and he asked me to send administrative leaders to help him. I first communicated with Reich Treasurer SCHWARZ who told me explicitly that he had no orders along that line from the Fuehrer and that I could send a man only with the explicit understanding that his function would be that of a consultant. I then sent Standartenfuehrer ROSSIG from my Bureau. He reported to me that he had to handle feeding and maintenance, and in order to help him he asked me to send out blankets and cooking vessels from SA stocks. Groups stationed nearby, in Silesia and Bayreuth, had already of their own accord given their assistance along such lines.

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I subsequently approved of these measures, and I did this without qualms of conscience because I was under the impression, and had reason to believe, that what was involved meant mitigation of the suffering of the refugees. The SA did not place money at their disposal.

I did not know whether these refugees were gathered into formations and for a certain purpose. As far as I know the SA did not play any part in connection with the occupation of the Sudeten country; in any case I did not make any funds available for such purposes; nor had they asked for from anywhere. It is true that the SA unit "Feldherrnhalle" was used. This format was at that time, however, a part of the Air Force, and consequently of the Wehrmacht. In all other respects the same measures were repeated, after occupation of the Sudetenland, as after the invasion of Austria.

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E - The War.

It is true that the SA had taken measures in the event of war. However, in keeping with the purpose for which the SA was formed, these were measures of economy, for example combining of offices, etc. When the war broke out, a considerable percentage not only of SA men but also of the Leader Corps joined the Wehrmacht. As a result all SA activity was suspended at first; nor was the SA given special assignments. I remember that it was planned to assign to the SA the task of organizing the air raid protection, but Chief-of-Staff LUTZE refused. On the other hand, pre-military training now became an active duty for the SA in that it embraced the older age-classes, the call-up of which could be anticipated. Training consisted of basic Infantery training without arms; only small-caliber rifles for shooting practice were available in limited quantities. SA leaders or men who had served in the Army handled the training. Participation in such training was voluntary. In my opinion these measures had little military value because the trainees were very rarely regular in their attendance and, in any case were usually very soon transferred to the Wehrmacht or drafted for labor service.

SA members called up for military service were cared for through so-called Group or field post letters, which contained news from the homefront of interest to the respective SA man.

It goes without saying that with the outbreak of the war there were also other assignments given the SA, for example, collecting of metal scrap, rags, paper and similar drives. It was also called upon to help in cases of emergency such as heavy snowfalls, catastrophies caused by floods, or bringing in the crop. The SA had nothing to do with organization of air raid protection, as already mentioned. It stands to reason that the individual SA man had to do his share of air raid protection duties, just as any other man. Otherwise nothing was changed in the assignments of the SA.

As regards the parts of the occupied territories which were incorporated into Germany - for example the Warthe region - the SA soon came into existence. Only racial Germans or German nationals were admitted; no

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special assignments were given to it.

In the General Government - just as had previously been done in the Protectorate - SA units were recruited from racial Germans or German nationals; they likewise were not given special assignments. I remember that Chief-of-Staff LUTZE flatly refused to use SA in those regions for Police duties. In so far as in these regions premises were needed for the establishment of central administrative offices, they were rented or purchased in a normal manner.

Also during the war the SA carried out no assignments of a purely military character. For example, no SA units in their entirety were used in guarding prisoners of war camps. In any case I know nothing about it.

As regards the establishment and supervision of concentration camps, the SA as such had nothing to do with this. I am convinced that all the SA men knew no more about the concentration camps than I did. Until the end of the war I only knew about camps at Dachau, Oranienburg and Woellerdorf. I attended numerous meetings of Group Leaders and many Party meetings; at no time was there anything discussed about the meaning, purpose and organization of the concentration camps. And until the end of the war I

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knew nothing of atrocities said to have been committed in the camps. Also I never heard that it had been planned to use the SA proper in combat against parachutists, or agents, much less that they were actually used. In my opinion they would not even have been qualified to serve that capacity because they were unarmed and were not quartered in barrac

I also wish to stress that the SA was completely passed over at the time the German People's Levy (Volkssturm) was established. This in my opinion bests reflects the situation that during the war also the SA had no influence at all. I was under the impression that HIMMLER and BORMANN both fought for the power.

In any case during the war the SA had still less to do with the State leadership and direction of the Party than before. From the beginning the Chief-of-Staff LUTZE had had but rare opportunities - and if so only after overcoming great difficulties - to discuss SA matters with the Fuehrer. Appointments were often made but either posponed or cancelled. So it came about that LUTZE had a conference with the Fuehrer at the utmost two to three times a year. He never took part in Cabinet meetings. None of the Chiefs of the Central Office of the SA had occasion to report to the Fuehrer; only Obergruppenfuehrer JUETTNER called on the Fuehrer a few times after LUTZE's death. These conditions did not change when SCHEPMAN became SA Chief of Staff. There is equally little cause to speak of actual links between the SA and the individual ministries or most of the offices of the Party Leadership. Relations between the Chief-of-Staff and BORMANN and HIMMLER were such that I cannot remember that at any time during the last few years had there been a serious conference. LUTZE and SCHEPMAN repeatedly expressed their annoyance about this. It is true that GOERING came from the ranks of the SA and for a brief period was SA Chief-of-Staff. But especially after the assumption of power his connection was very slight. He only made his appearance before the SA as honorary leader in connection with important affairs. His authority to issue orders was nil; he also never gave his attention to purely SA matters. The reason for GOERING's

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becoming Chief of the "Feldherrnhalle" regiment was on the one hand an expression of appreciation of his services to the SA during the time of its struggles and, since respect for the SA had dwindled considerably as a result of 30 June 1934, it was expected to help to improve this situation. The fact is, anyhow, that GOERING put in an appearance with SA as its member so rarely that undoubtedly a great many SA men did not even know that GOERING was an Honorary SA Leader.

Among the rest of the defendants on trial in Nuernberg, only FRANK and STREICHER are known to me as SA members. They also were in no way prominent in SA matters; STREICHER was Honorary SA Leader and, towards the end, FRANK headed only nominally the General Government Group; in fact the leadership was in the hands of SA Leader PEIZ and SA Leader KUBRUEMUND. Neither FRANK's nor STREICHER's influence over the SA amount to anything; in any case I know nothing about it and in this respect likewise I am certain that hardly any of the SA men - with the exception of those in the regimental areas - knew that FRANK and STREICHER were SA Leaders. I do not know whether any one else, or several of the others, who are on trial in Nuernberg were members of the SA; but I do know for certain that none of the other defendants had any influence on the SA in any way.

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In conclusion I may state with fullest conviction and in keeping with my oath.

1) The purpose for which the SA was intended excludes beyond doubt the commission of crimes such as mentioned in article 6 of the Indictment of the International Military Tribunal. Should such crimes have been committed nonetheless, persons who committed them placed themselves thereby in opposition to the purposes for which the SA was intended; they are outsiders and, consequently, the SA has neither any connection with such crimes nor can it be held responsible for same.

2) Membership in the SA was on the whole voluntary. It is possible that when the admission of whole units was concerned - as for instance in the case of the Stahlhelm - that some of these men became SA members under some pressure, so to say. I also believe that after the assumption of power quite a few men joined the SA hoping thus to be more successful in finding work.

3) Since the SA did not pursue criminal goals it follows that SA men also could not be acquainted with such goals. Should the defendants on trial in Nuernberg be guilty of such crimes an SAman had knowledge of it in but very few - in fact exceptional - cases which did not come to my attention. The great bulk of the SA knew nothing about such crimes and could not know of such crimes, since such crimes had not even come to my attention who, as the head of the SA Leadership, of course knew so much more about what was going on.

This statement on 18 pages is made at IC 78 Zuffenhausen/Germany/ at 14.00 hours 9th of May 1946. I swear before God that it is the whole truth.

(s) Georg Mappes
Georg MAPPES
Internee No. 2426
Internment Camp 78
Zuffenhausen/Germany

Subscribed and sworn to before me at IC 78 Zuffenhausen/Germany 9th day of May 1946.

(s) William W. Silver
William W. Silver
Captain Inf.
Investigator
War Crimes Branch
Ludwigsburg Detachment

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The German Camp Director
Internment Camp 79

Ludwigsburg, 13 April 1946

In reference to the indictment against the SA. I state the following:

REIMANN, Hans, born on 13 November 1906 at Lueben/Silesia
Business manager, later main office SA-leader,
now residing at Diesen on Ammersee/Upper Bavaria.
Prisoner No. 5 301 171

I was in the SA from 1930 unitl the end. In the year 1931 became Sturmfuehrer, 1933 Sturmbannfuehrer and in July 1934 main-office SA-leader. I then led two units in succession in Silesia. In September 1936 I was transferred to the staff of the supreme SA-leadership at Munich, and there I was departmental chief of the SA-Sports-Badge-Division until the beginning of the war. I served in the armed forces from August 1939 until July 1943. After being discharged from the armed service I was leader of the Graz-Brigade until the end.

I. 1930 until 30 January 1933

In the years prior to 30 January 1933 the task of the SA consisted of propagandizing for the NSDAP, protecting meetings and recruiting members of the party and the SA. Several attempts of the German Communist Party and the German Socialist Party to disturb and to break up meetings were prevented. Many of the SA-men under my command were maltreated by political opponents in the street in front of the employment office and also at their place of work.

Recruiting marches of the SA at that time were numerous. For the preparation of a disciplined and impressive appearance drill- and marching exercises were regularly carried out. We practiced many songs in order to draw the attention of the population on recruiting marches. Every SA-man had to purchase his own uniforms and other equipment. On many occasions the expenses for propaganda-trips, repairs of bycicles etc. were paid from personal funds. Since the majority of the men were poor or unemployed, much idealism was needed.

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General physical sport-training, including small-caliber firing, more extensive marches and terrain sports, were already at that time part of the regular training.

The entry into the SA was always voluntary, and it could be left at any time.

Every SA-man swore an oath of loyalty to Adolf HITLER and in the text of the oath also swore to obey the orders of all superiors, insofar as these did not demand "anything unlawful" from him.

Terrorism toward political opponents was never practiced in my territory, insofar as individual clashes occurred, the SA-men were always attacked and had to protect themselves in self-defense.

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II. 30 January 1933 until August 1936.

Nothing has come to my knowledge of the introduction of military combat training by the SA after 30 January 1933. Since protecting meetings and general recruiting for the party became rather superfluous, more time was at our disposal for more intensive physical training and for the training of units in strict, disciplined deportment. In this every single SA-man was constantly urged in his personal appearance and his conduct in the family and at his place of work to be an example to his fellow-nationals in comradeship, willingness to help, willingness to work, and personal, decent living. SA-men who acted contrary to this demand were reprimanded and lectured to, and dismissed from the SA after repeated offenses.

Lectures by doctors and other specialists on public-health problems were to further mental flexibility and increase the knowledge of all SA-men. SA-men thus treated helped raise the general level of public health.

By an increase in physical training the one-sided physical development caused by professional work was to be compensated for, and the SA-man kept physically and mentally healthy and agile until ripe old age.

On marches and in terrain sports the SA-men were pointed out the beauties of their homeland and of nature and urged to use all their strength to improve this homeland and the living conditions of the people living in it. We voluntarily assisted in the construction of settlements, in bringing in the harvest, in draining and in regulating creeks; in the country especially we constructed sport-fields and swimming-pools; by way of precaution we trained ourselves in fighting natural disasters, like forest fires, floods, etc. We always only wanted to be active helpers in the reconstruction of a beautiful German fatherland in which every German, regardless of profession, religion or former political attitude, could earn a living wage and lead a decent life. For these reasons alone even a contemplated aggressive war would have been contrary to our actions.

I would yet like to emphasize that every SA-man took these tasks upon himself without compensation and without any personal advantages. The expenses for his uniform, for small-caliber ammunition and personal expenses on parades etc. had to be borne by him personally and in addition to this, he sacrificed

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his spare time which others could devote to their families, for his idealism.

Aside from the SA-dagger, the SA-man did not possess any weapons; SA-leaders could also carry a pistol. Besides a few small-caliber rifles (on the average approximately 3 per Sturm), the SA-units did not have any weapons or other military items of war equipment.

Special units, like the Combat Engineers, dispatch riders (Nachrichter), and medics were activated for use within the framework of the SA-service. The Riding Stuerme (Reiterstuerme) trained their men in riding and driving, and deepened the knowledge for the sensible care and treatment of animals among the rural population.

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Sheet 2 to the report of Reimann, Hans.

The exercises were not based on strategical assumptions, but as training for combatting of potential catastrophes, and similar things. I recall that in the years 1933-34 Sunday duties somtimes began with field services and that in the year 1933 some SA-men who had only be married officially before now were afterwards married clerically. I also know that ministers belonged to the SA, one of them even was SA-Sturmbannfuehrer. On the occasion of my wedding in 1933, units of the Sturmbann under my command at the time, about 500 men strong, marched in formation and participated in my clerical wedding with all flags of the Sturm.

Since the rush to enter the SA in 1933 was very great, every applicant had to submit a testimonial of condact by the police to prevent the absorption of anti-social or criminal elements. On the other hand, during this time I have accepted many former members of the German Communist Party and the German Socialist Party if theyr seems suitable as to character and reputation. Some of them have even obtained leading positions in the SA at a later time.

In many cases excerpts of court-prosecution-registers were furthermore requested in order to keep criminally inclined elements from the SA or to dismiss them.

In the fielsd under me a relationship of courtesy without mutual influence existed with the armed forces, which expressed itself in the participation of officers and SA-leaders as guests at social and sport-meetings of the armed forces and the SA.

In and the unit-leaders under my command made use of the service-law-code only in individual cases, whereby prison-sentences were not imposed. As fas as I can remember, an introduction to the service-law-code stated that the latter was to be primarily an instrument of education. It was effective merely by the fact that it threatened punishment.

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In my capacity as leader of an SA-unit I was not subordinated to the local political leader. He could not issue any orders to the SA. The SA-duty was only carried out in accordance with my directions. If meetings were to be heldin common, then their procedure was agreed on in a mutual discussion.

III. September 1936 until the beginning of the war.

Early September 1936 I was first of all placed on the Staff of the Supreme SA-Leadership, and later on transferred there. After several months familiarizing myself with the work I took over the direction of the SA-Sports-Badge Division, a post I held until I was called into the armed services at the beginning of the war. During the period of this activity, a new procedure was introduced for obtaining the SA-Sports-Badge. In connection with this some fundamental remarks are pertinent:

Several years after the First World War the German Reich-Sports-Badge, was introduced. The conditions for obtaining it were relatively severe. One had to be an experienced, well-trained sportsman in order to be able to obtain it. I is also a fact, that during a period of many years only a very small percentage of the population, which could not bear any weight for a general physical education of the whole people,was able to get it. It therefore, could not be considered as an attraction for a work of the masses.

I believe that this fact was an important reason for the institution of the SA-Sports-Badge. In any case this point-of-view influenced my conduct during my term of office in the Supreme SA-leadership. By simple, popular exercises which appealed to the interests of the broad masses with relatively small demands on one's ability all classes of the people in the cities and in the country were to be attracted to compete for the SA-Sports-Badge.

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I suppose that the International Military Tribunal has in its possession the "Regulations of Procedure and Examination" for the SA-Sports-Badge.

In them my assertions can be proven.

If, for example, a full field-pack-march, small-caliber-firing, throwing and aiming of hand-grenades, swimming biccling and an obstacle course with gasmask were demanded from Group II, then these exercises on the one hand corresponded to the tendencies of the German male population, and on the other hand they were to stimulate activity in the sense of raising the general public health by strengthening the will, the endurance, etc., and for the preparation of a purely passive defense of the country.

As the basis of this I list:

Firstly: March with full field-pack: More extensive meetings of the party and the state were almost always connected with parades of all organizations, for example, the German Labor Front, etc. For these parades the participants for the most part had to make long advance marches. The advance march, parade, and return march often consisted of more than 20 kilometers. Aside from its plupical value this fact was also factor in introducing marching with a full-field-pack.

Secondly: Small-caliber firing. Shooting practice is not only popular in Germany. I recall the example of Switzerland, whose regulating for training in shooting I studied prior to the re-construction of the SA-Sports-Badge. Sharpshooting - clubs have existed in Germany for hundreds of years, even in many smaller towns and villages. National and international competitions were also held by these clubs prior to 1933, which already existed a long time before the founding of the SA. The inclusion of small-caliber firing into the conditions for the elegibility of the SA-Sports-Badge was one of the ways this badge was hoped to be made popular. Furthermore, the conditions for the German Reich-Sports-Badge also contained small-caliber firing.

Thirdly: Hand-grenade target throwing was originally called "cudgel-target-throwi It is an exercise for increasing the power of concentration, for distributing labor and safety-measures. Practice grenades made of wood were used. The name of "hand-grenade" for this actual wooden cudgel was to conciliate the veterans.

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Fourthly: Swiming or bicycling. In Germany, just ar everywhere in the world, thousands drown annually because they do not know how to swim. If the SA demanded swimming-achievements in its Sports-Badge, it wanted to help save many human lives. However, since in many rural areas without any larger bodies of water the population could not be given any opportunity to learn how to swim, another exercise had to be selected as a substitut for those areas. We chose bicycling because it is indispensable in rural traffic; for example the rural firemen used bicycles if they had to fight fires in the neighboring villages. With this exercise, therefore, the SA was of service to those institutions common to both the state and the communities. Since in this exercise more credit was given for swimming than for bicycling, the construction of swimming-pools was stimulated.

Fifthly: Cross-field obstacle-course with gas mask. The civilian air raid precaution measures had led to the manufacture and distribution of a people's gas mask. As the grim reality later on confirmed, it was presumed that all able men would have to be assigned to combat the damages during or after air-attacks. Since this compelled them to climb over rubble, jump into cellars, crawl through the small openings and, under certain conditions, had to protect themselves at the same time with the gas mask, these facts were a reason.

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for the introduction of this exercise. Since civilian air raid precautions can probably only be considered as defense, it thereby at most served in the preparation of a very passive warfare.

The above explanations about the "military sports" of Group II generally also apply to the "terrain sports" of Group III.

By means of the most simple exercises like reconnaissance, observing, locating etc. mental agility was to be improved, and the German man was to learn how to travel through his homeland with open eyes.

For these territories with an overwhelmingly sea-faring population the "terrain sports" of Group III were adjusted to the interests of these people in water sports, as can be seen from the orders of procedure.

At the beginning of Paragraph III I have pointed out that the SA-Sports-Badge was to be the foundation for improving the physical fitness of the German people on the broadest basis.

The repeater-exercises introduced in the year 1937 were to be a further means for this purpose. We wanted to prevent a man from obtaining the badge in his best years and there after place no value on this physical fitness. With the introduction of the repeater-exercises, he had to pass a certain number of exercises prescribed for obtaining the badge, if he wished to remain in the possession of it. If he refrained from taking the repeater-exercises, then the badge was taken away from him. If he participated regularly in these repeater-exercises for a number of years, then he received in recognition the badge in silver and later on in gold. This was to provide them with the necessary stimulation to keep physically and mentally sound and agile up to an advanced age.

For purposes of eduction and for giving the tests, many of those who were eligible teachers and examiners, had to be trained all over Germany. They had to receive detailed instructions prior to the beginning of their activity as the tests for the German Reich Sports Badge were only given by active sportsmen with years of experience after having undergone courses or training in the various sport branches.

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Eligibility to teach and to examine was not only conferred on members of the SA, but also on those of the SS, the NSKK and the RAD who had fulfilled the prerequisites after having undergone a training course. The training courses were given at the Reich- and Group Schools of the SA. The armed forces took part neither for the personnel nor technical aspects of the planning and training. Achieving the goal of the training course involved being qualified as SA-leader or sub-leader but, this was not acknowledged in the armed services, nor was it a qualification for any grade in the armed forces.

Of the many examples which have come to my knowledge, I only wish to recount a personal one: When in the year 1938 I reported for my first training into the armed forces, I was a Senior SA-leader (SA-Oberfuehrer) and had obtained the right to teach in Munich and the right to examine at the Reich School at Dresden. In spite of this, I entered the armed forces as a rifleman and was only appointed to Private First Class after my second training in autumn of 1938. In this capacity I reported to the armed forces at the beginning of the war, and, after having stood the test, I became corporal in the spring of 1940. After I was decorated I became Sergeant in the autumn of 1940, and only after having made good further I became Lieutenant in May 1941. With this rank I was discharged from the armed service in 1943. Looking back on these years, I can only state that I have at least worked as hard to become an officer as the other German

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officers. The same thing happened to many SA-leaders I knew. Our work in the SA therefore did not bring us any advantages with regard to service in the armed forces, but to the contrary, we SA-leaders were so taken up with work in the years before the war, that we were only able to take part very late and then for the most part in only few training courses of the armed forces. In contrast to us SA-leaders, for example, many teachers and members of other professions were already reserve-officers at the beginning of the war because they had enough time in the years of peace to go through the required obligatory exercises. According to my knowledge, the SA-leaders were urged not until the years 1938/39 to go through their exercises with the armed forces, because it had been discovered, that many SA-men did not return to the SA after having served their active obligatory duty, because they did not want to subordinate themselves to superiors who had not served. Even as the SA-leader entered the armed forces as a rifleman without having previously served after he had obtained the right to teach and to examine in the schools of the SA, but did not draw any advantage there from his previous activity in theSA, so, according to my knowledge, the active non-commissioned officer or officer, who had been discharged from the armed forces, could also only enter the SA as an SA-man. (Pvt.) Only after properly qualifying in an SA-school was it possible for him to occupy leading positions in the SA.

In concluding my statements about the relationship of the SA to the armed forces, I would not leave unmentioned, the fact that the SA in various regulations about drill, marches, etc. has depended in a large measure on customs of the armed forces for its oral nomenclature as well as in the formal execution of the regulations. These were either bound by tradition or they had proven themselves adapted to the purpose. Why should an SA-man be taught a command and its execution in a form which varied from that of the armed forces? He would have forgotten whatever he had learned when he entered the armed forces, would have to relearn everything, and after his time of service he would have to repeat the same procedure again with his entry into the SA. I believe that most of the SA-men would never have found their way back into the SA after their time of service, especially if it were known

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that large circles of the armed forces did not recognize the activity of the SA and described it to the young soldiers as playing around. However, decisive for both parts were the declarations by Adolf HITLER and other authoritative personalities of the state given repeatedly in public that only the Wehrmacht were the armed forces of the nation.

During the period of my activity in the Supreme SA-Leadership the annexation of Austria and the events of the 9 November 1938 took place.

In connection with the annexation of Austria I only know that some time after the marching in of the armed forces the "Austrian Legion" marched in its homeland. It consisted of SA-men who had previously been forced to flee from Austria to Germany because of political persecution, and who were organized here in the SA in a closed unit, the so-called "Legion". It can be imagined that these men had the sole wish to be able to return as quickly as possible to their families.

On 9 November 1938 I was in Munich, and in the evening I returned with my wife and my oldest son on the express-train Munich-Breslau to my Silesian homeland in order to attend a family celebration. Although I was always informed of all orders of the Supreme SA-Leadership, neither a written

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nor an oral order for the burning of synagognes or similar measures have come to my knowledge. In my home town of Lueben the local synagogne was not destroyed and must still stand if it has not been destroyed by military action.

Towards the end of 1938 the Supreme Command of the SA began with the preparatory work for a pre- and post military training. As HITLER stipulated in his decree of January 1939, in which he entrusted the SA with this task, this should be done on the basis of the SA-Sport Insignia. The insignia itself received the name of "SA-Military Insignia" ("SA-Wehrabzeichen").

As already mentioned above, it should be made possible for every German man to carn the badge and he will then be induced by regular repetition of the training to keep physically end mentally alert and healthy as long as possible.

The first year of repeater exercises, 1938, showed that the recruiting and registration of all participants was attended by difficulties which could be solved only by employement of an extensive executive organization. With the adoption of the repeater excersises as pre- and post military training, the SA was placed in a position to use the recruiting office and their trained personnel for this purpose.

Discussions with the OKH should result in the clarification of this question. Moreover, for reasons already stated before, the partly achieved assimilation of certain expressions, commands and their execution linguistically and practically, to the terms usual in the German Armed Forces should be examined again. I remember that during one of these conference, the Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces) rejected full-field pack- march as being unpopular and not modern. But it was retained as many other exercises. Training with modern weapons and in the technique of a modern war of aggression was not mentioned, as far as I know. It would also have been impossible to carry it out at that time as only a diminishing percentage of the SA-Leader and Sub-Leaders had served or held ranks as officers and N.C.O. of the service rank in the German Armed Forces, as my own example showed already. To my knowledge, the conferences did no come to a conclusion and a final settlement, because the war broke out.

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IV. From the beginning to the end of the War

At the beginning of the war I was called up to the Army and fought in the 19th Infantry Regiment.

I was discharged from the German Military Forces in the summer of 1943 and appointed as a Leader of the SA brigade in Graz. The SA men of this brigade were about 90% from the military services. Only a small number of these SA men who were distributed through a large district and were overburdened with work in the farming, industry and restaurant business, were still at home. The SA units had an average strength of from 10 to 15 men; units of only 4 - 5 men were distrubuted in many districts and were no rarity. It was impossible to carry out a regular, and to some degree a planned, SA-Service. Essentially only a skeleton of the SA units could be kept together after the war. Occasional meetings served to foster comradship and a permanent connection with the retired friends.

The numerous and somewhat stronger units were combined into auxiliary troops for clearance work after air raids.

During my activity in Graz the SA units were not used for guard duties of concentration camps, prisoners of war and camps for foreigners.

All the SA work practically ceased with the organization of the Volkssturm in 1944.

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as all SA leaders and men were placed in the Volkssturm.

I certyfy in lieu of oath that I have made the above statements to the best of my knowledge and conscience. I have been informed about the criminal consequences of a false declaration in lieu of oath.

s/ Hans REIMANN

I certify and confirm the above signature after evidence of identity according to authorization of the CI of the Internment camp 79 of 15.4.46

s/ ALTSTADTLER (?)

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C.I. Camp 91, Darmstadt

Darmstadt, 26 April 1946

PETERSEN, Hans, born 13 September 1885 in ATHENS (Greece) Major (ret.)
rresident in IMMENSTADT/ Allgaeu, Internment No. 533094

former SA-Obergruppenfuehrer

Personal:

Offices held in the SA:

1933: Instructor in ideological training in the Reich Leadership School of the SA in Munich (Highest SA-Command)

1-1-1934 - 14-1-36: Department Chief in the same office of the Supreme SA-Command

15-1-193[illegible] - 30-9-1941: Leader of the 39th SA Brigade in Dessau (Anhalt)

20-4-1940 - 30-11-1941: Deputy of the Leader of the Thueringen SA Group in Weimar

1-12-1941 - 1945: Chief of the Main Personnel Office of the Supreme SA-Command in Munich.

Pertinent Matter:

The opportunity has just now been afforded me to take a position to the extraordinary weighty charges against the organization of the SA before the International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg, which purport to declare the organization named as criminal.

Before I attempt to render impotent and contradict the prosecution's charges individually in the form of a statement in lieu of oath, I consider myself especially obligated, as former Obergruppenfuehrer and Chief of the Main Personnel Office of the Supreme SA-Command, to take a stand concerning the charges against SA, because:

1. I do not know whether the former Chief of Staff of the SA, Wilhelm SCHEPMANN or his permanent former deputy, Obergruppenfuehrer Max JUETTNER, as the most professional and responsible leaders in Nuernberg, were present, or whether another former active higher leader, <u>active</u> in the SA, represents the interests of the SA before the International Military Tribunal,

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2. the sole responsibility in affairs relating to personnel for the Chief of Staff was carried over to me as Chief of the Main Personnel Office,
3. beyond that, the Office of the Supreme SA-Court in the Supreme SA-Command was subordinated to me.

On the part of the Prosecution, the Chief American Judge expressly stated that the more important aim than the punishment of the leaders of the Third Reich was the erection of a dam of international law against war. There can be no doubt that almost everyone will approve of this goal. The former League of Nations recognized this aim also, but nevertheless did not attain it. The reasons for the failure of the League of Nations are to be found in the fact that the most important state in this board, the U.S.A. was not represented as a member in spite of the fact that the great idea had come from the U.S.A. For another thing, it was above all the impossible severe conditions which were imposed on the German nation in the peace treaty of Versailles, in the Dawes and Young Plan which practically would have allowed Germany to lapse into slavery for centuries. Only he who was familiar with the inner-political conditions in the Germany of the years 1920-1932 can understand the fact that a basic change was longed for by all German-conscious circles. That such a change of the inner-political relationships, after the failure of the national revolution of 9 November 1923, could come about only by legal means, was clear to see. The legality of the struggle for the usurpation of the state power was sworn to by the leader of the Party in 1930 before the highest German court, the Reich Court in Leipzig. The program publicly announced by the leader of the NSDAP promised the nation freedom, work, and bread. At that time, 1919, commencing with the collapse, a change of values took place through a widespread inflation brought about by hyenas of finance without conscience; the destruction of a healthy economy by the reparations imposed, coupled with an avalanche-like increasing

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unemployment such as had been hitherto unknown, brought an horrible need to Germany for the first time in its history to such an extent. The rousing call of Adolf HITLER for cooperation in order to overcome Germany's want, called the most active worthwhile forces of the nation to the plan. The number of the followers of HITLER grew in ever-increasing numbers and came from all sections and classes of society. Men who, for the most part, had been together in the horrors of the first World War united in order to save Germany from the certain decline, just as the same men before, without regard for person, rank, or lineage had performed their duty to the fatherland in the trenches of the first World War.

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The indescribable want in Germany had as consequences: insecurity before law, unrest, acts of violence, corruption, anarchistic conditions, which finally threatened to throw Germany into a chaos. In order to meet this need with success, to prepare an end to the anarchistic conditions, to reinstitute the order disrupted by bad elements, that could only succeed if unselfish men united to serve only the community, ready for sacrifice, who were ready under disciplined leadership but nevertheless on a voluntary basis, to stake all for the community living in dire need. The extraordinary high casualties in the battle for inner-political order and the re-establishing of generally held concepts of law attest to the idealism and the devotion with which the fighters of the NSDAP were inspired, to preserve not only their fatherland, but also Western Europe from Bolshevism, which is the denial of all human order. How clearly did Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1919 already and again before the outbreak of the second World War point out this danger for Europe!

For the protection of their political gatherings which served for the enlightenment of the bulk of the nation, a well-disciplined "Order Unit" had to be created; it was composed exclusively of independent and young members and followers of the Party, of which about 80% had participated the World War. They had the horrors of the war behind them and naturally were completely opposed to the thought of a new war. The charge of planning, preparing, or completely carrying-out a war of aggression appears accordingly in itself as senseless. This" Order Unit" received after its first trial the name "SA-Sturm Abteilung". It protected the work of the Party and its propaganda from the for the most part armed terrorism of political opponents, the K.P.D. and the U.S.P.D. (Spartakus) and the S.P.D. (Reichsbanner), without itself terrorizing. The basic thought of the SA was to serve the community, through bodily exercises and sport activities to strengthen the body, to educate its members to honor-

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loving, healthy manhood, to weld itself together into a closely-knit manly comradeship, disclaiming all differences of class, forming a well-disciplined organization of the Party in voluntary subordination to its appointed leaders. The SA never bore arms, as has been repeatedly publicly emphasized. They carried as external sign of their right of defense a small dagger, and completed their final education in small arms as was practiced in the youth organizations of almost all the countries. If an SA man wished to carry a weapon (a pistol, for example), he had to get a weapon permit issued by the local police authorities. The SA was never employed to carry out state or organizational matters. All duties of the SA took place completely in public, also in view of the foreigners residing in Germany. Since 1934, a long list of foreign diplomats took part in the manifestations of the SA, representing crosssections of the official labor elements. It never came to my knowledge that one of the

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signatory powers of the peace Treaty of Versailles ever protested against the nature and activity of the SA; on the contrary, members of the diplomatic corps were represented in almost all great organizations, taking part also in conradly gatherings. Would that have been possible in full public sight, had the SA been a criminal organization? Also, the former Ambassador of the French Republic, Mr. FRANCOIS PONCET, was among the guests of the SA. One of the most celebrated American authors of today, Sinclair Lewis, also reported concerning the SA in his book "Adolf Hitler"; he wrote from his own observation and experience but writes nothing of the criminal intentions or of secret conventions, but tries in his book to present the true ideas and intentions of the National Socialists to the American nation. The contention put forth again and again by the prosecution that the SA was involved in a conspiracy intended or designed to train its members in crime or offenses against humanity, can now be labeled as absurd since the contrary is the case. The SA was again and again the special organization of the party, always ready to help. Under natural conditions or in states of emergency of any sort, it was on the spot, provided shelter and aid for those threatened or stricken, and was active in housing emergencies by founding settlements in community labor without any sort of recompense. That can be no criminal organization which has readiness to help and humanity written on its shield. Especially also during the last war, the SA, during and after the fearful ravages by the air raids, distinguished itself by its readiness to sacrifice.

Many hundreds of thousands of innocent leaders and men of the SA, serving only their idealism, are to be held as criminals; this is without doubt the deeper significance of indictment raised in Nuernberg. Of these 200,000 have found a soldier's death at the fronts for their fatherland, genuinely believing in an ideology which is considered by the democracies as a false doctrine. The so-called crime of these SA adherents consists only therein, that they were adherents of the National Socialistic idea, that they staked all for their nation, for the state which was recognized

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by all nations of the world and with which diplomatic relationships were carried on until the outbreak of war in 1939, by all the states which are now prosecutors. To impose a collective responsibility on the SA openly is something new in the German concept of law. I hold myself duty-bound to save the honor of my living and fallen comrades as a former leading personality of the SA, if only from moral grounds, to take a stand to rehabilitate it as its sacredness demands.

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Being informed of the penal character of a false affidavit, I hereby make the following statement in lieu of oath, giving particulars concerning the documents and the indictment counts submitted by the Prosecutor of the International Military Tribunal of Nuernberg:

1) The objectives and tasks of the SA are generally set forth in ADOLF HITLER's book "Mein Kampf" in the 9th Chapter which can be presumed to be generally known. Furthermore, the tasks, objectives, activities and methods, as well as structure and organization, of the SA are set forth in detail in the service directives and educational regulations. The task of the SA has also been repeatedly and clearly outlined quite publicly in ADOLF HITLER's speeches. The educational regulations and service directives were to be found in book-shops and likewise all publications concerning the SA service and its organization were to be found in the periodical "The SA Man" and its supplement "The SA Officer" both of which could even be bought in railway station bookstalls. It was obvious that in a disciplined organization like the SA, observance of the given regulations and directives should have been strictly enforced and any infraction of them severely penalized. An implication of SA members in a general, collective plan to participate in actions which are bound to be described as criminal could not occur without the knowledge of the supreme SA command and would, if such was actually, the case, be ruthlessly prevented and the culprits punished and expelled regardless of who they were. It is utterly impossible that secret organizations with criminal objectives should have existed within the SA without being discovered, admitting that they existed at all. In this connection, it must be pointed out that it was expressly stipulated in the oath formula that no SA member need comply with orders violating existing laws. In the position I held, any secret agreements or secret objectives of the supreme SA command were <u>bound</u> to come to my knowledge but there were none.

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It must also be emphasized in this connection that after 30 June 1934, the SA was completely withdrawn from political leadership. Whereas Chief of Staff ROEHM was a "Reichsminister", his successor VIKTOR LUTZE became merely "Reichsleiter", a position which was not even any longer conferred on the last Chief of Staff, WILHELM SCHEPMANN. Since 1 July 1935, therefore the supreme command was not represented in the Reich cabinet, neither did it have any influence on the plans of Foreign policy or the decisions of the supreme leadership of the Reich. I,therefore, consider inadmissible the contention that the SA has participated in the planning, preparation, initiation or conduct of a war of aggression or of any war, involving violation of international treaties, agreements and promises or had previous information of such.

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2) The SA-Organization never received an order fro execution, on the contrary such an order in principle was deliberately refused by Chief of Staff LUTZE, as well as by Chief of Staff Schepmann. It was most strictly forbidden for all members of the SA to be a member of a secret league. If the State demanded the detachment of men to special units as, si.g. in 1933, after the seizure of power, to the auziliary police in order to reinforce the State police authorities, or to the protection of objects (Objektschutz) or to other special tasks of the political system, the assignment took place by the emergency service obligation, while relieving the Supreme SA-Leadership and of responsibility its subordinate offices.

3) In the sphere of church policy, a clear interdiction had been given as early as 12 May 1934 by the decree of former Chief of Staff ROEHM, according to which any participation of the SA in political demonstrations against the church whatever and any kind of measures against clergymen of both denominations was forbidden.

4) Insofar as SA-members were guilty of looting and self-enrichment during the campaign against the Jews in 1938, these men, according to my knowledge, were handed over to the regular courts and punished, in the same way as the dirty elements of the populace that had chiefly availed themselves of the opportunity to plunder. The Supreme SA Leadership was <u>not informed</u> of the campaign in advance, had received no orders for this purpose nor passed them on; but had disapproved them in every respect.

5) I never received any information about the SA being used or ordered for guarding or controlling prisoners-of-war, concentration or forced labor camps.

6) Although I was employed in leading positions in the SA ever since the seizure of power in 1933 and after this time in the Supreme SA-Leadership for 8 years, I never saw or heard about an order, according to which confusion was to be created and political opponents terrorized. I do maintain, however, that the SA Organization had to take over the protection of the Party from enemy terrorism during the struggle for the legal seizure of power, terrorism which at that time was mostly carried out by armed terrorists,

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and so against the "Rot Front", "Spartakus" and "Reichsbanner."

7) The SA attached the greatest importance to having only irreproachable men, without a criminal past, in their ranks. Impure elements were expelled. From the year 1935 on excerpts from penal records were obtained from the competent courts and examined. If it appeared that previous criminal convictions were recorded, a dismissal from the SA followed on the grounds of unfitness.

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A great many cases are known to me, in which members of the SA, because of criminal actions in or off duty, were punished with expulsion and surrendered to the ordinary courts. According to an agreement with the Reich Ministry of Justice, all courts of the Reich have been instructed to inform the competent superior SA offices of those charged with any punishable actions of SA members before condemnation, so that the SA was able to exclude these elements even before condemnation from the ranks of the SA, if this appeared necessary on account of the severity of the punishable action. On the other hand, no case has become known to me in which a member of the SA, convicted of a crime, has escaped punishment by a regular court. The Supreme SA Tribunal had jurisdiction in all punishable offence in the SA service, but decided also on the decision and punishment in cases in which criminal proceedings were initiated by ordinary courts with regard to the consequences, which were to follow for the entire organization of the SA with regard to the guilty person."

8) It has never been known to me that crimes or offences against humanity were committed by the SA, also, I assure you that with regard to myself I never have participated in such actions. It was equally unknown to me, that the SA is said to have violated internationally binding rules of warfare. Here also I assure you that I did not take part in any such offenses.

In the same way I assure you that on the part of the SA leadership or myself no common plan was ever worked out, nor did a conspiracy for the execution of the above-mentioned actions take place.

9) The SA was never urged or trained to use force. Training and education were strictly checked centrally by the Supreme SA Leadership and were subject to constant checking by inspections ordered especially for this purpose. Violations by individuals of clear regulations were punished as lack of discipline.

10) If in an organization of men of 1,4 millions, individual persons of this organization committed offences or even crimes, as this is fully possible in such an extensive organization drawn on a voluntary basis from all classes of the population and is also humanly understandable, then these

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individual crimes cannot provide an occasion for declaring the entire organization criminal. The organization of the SA to my knowledge, neither received an order to commit a crime nor issued such; it, therefore, cannot logically be considered as criminal and still less declared as such.

Hans ?

Signature: illegible

I certify above true
signature as witness
Darmstadt
1097

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I hereby certify that the above signature agrees with the accompanying letter.

Signature: illegible

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Contribution to the defense argument of the SA
that it is a criminal organization.

I declare in lieu of oath that I have made the following declarations to the best of my knowledge.

Personal data.

My name is Alexander GROSSKOPF. I was born in Strassburg in Alsace on December 14th 1884, am of Catholic faith, married; was municipal administration employee in Cologne by profession and am living now in Wahl (Rheinland), Linder Mausefad 373.

During the period 1919 - 1933 I was for a few years a member of the Social Democratic Party and on that account I had in 1933 to fear that I would lose my job. In order to avoid that danger - I had a wife and three children to take care of - I joined the Stahlhelm Association of front soldiers. Many politically like-minded friends did the same in order to have a political alibi. Together with this organization I was transferred to the SA reserve in April 1933. I belonged to the SA until called up for military service on 26 August 1939. During that time I made several requests for discharge which, however, were refused. Even upon my entry into the army I was not formally discharged; but from then on I had no more relations with the SA. As a soldier, I was no longer subject to them. I considered myself discharged. In these 6 years I reached the rank of an"Oberscharfuehrer", despite the fact that I never had led any "Schar" (troop) or even the smallest unit. I was a good sportsman and occupied myself exclusively with sports. I refrained from any active participation in politics and found that belonging to the party was not intolerable because I thus escaped being seized by the party for some political activity.

I am making the following factual explanations on the basis of my personal experience and observations and from the remarks made by higher SA leaders As I was critical of the inner working of the SA, I believe my observation were pertinent. I have often spoken about these things with like-minded comrades.

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Pertinent material: It is not intended to prove here that before the assumption of power by National Socialism the SA did not have the task of disseminating this policy among the people or that this task was not a criminal one. It is also not intended to prove that this task was theoretically not imposed on the SA after the assumption of power.

We intend to prove here that the greater part of the men who joined the SA after 31 January 1933 or who were transferred to the SA from other non-National Socialist associations did not take this step voluntarily, that they did not realize the import of their act, and that, when later they had misgivings, they were held fast by brutal measures, for instance, the dismissal from work.

It shall further be proved that the service in the SA after 1933 progressively and increasingly consisted in military sports and that the political part of its activity was more and more driven into the background; furthermore, that advancement in the SA after 1933 was obtained in the Unterfuehrer service ranks (up to Obertruppfuehrer inclusive) not chiefly from the political point of view, but in each case according to aptitude for military sports and that these ranks were in the course of time conferred without regard to existing leader positions, so that little by little all men physically and mentally fit became Unterfuehrer, without ever having led a unit or even the smallest part of one. These ranks in time came to have merely a decorative significance.

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To this it must be added:

When power was transferred to Hitler or seized by him there were in the Reich about five million unemployed. These were drawn into the SA by an active propaganda and the promise of procuring work and bread. Many others, particularly those who had belonged to the Marxist parties at first fled from persecution by the National Socialists into the Stahlhelm, Association of Front Soldiers, which was considered non-political but which was in opposition to National Socialism. It also promised work and bread. Both organizations became abnormally large. In accordance with the totalitarian pretentions of National Socialism a continued independent existence was made impossible for the Stahlhelm and it was therefore nearly everywhere transferred into the SA in each case according to the attitude of its higher leaders. Individual members were not consulted as to their wishes. Whoever did not follow was labeled as a traitor to the people and threatened. Thus did the SA increase from a small group of agitators into a gigantic organization of millions. Every discerning person gained the impression that the only remaining aim of the SA was to restrain and watch all unsafe but militarily fit elements so as to prevent any reactions.

Up to the ROEHM affair this tremendous reserve of men was not organised systematically or politically at all, but given military training quite superficially and this probably for reasons connected with the putsch. For a while tension even existed between the party and the SA. The SS looked down upon the SA as inferior.

A large percentage, indeed, was in the SA against its will. The only thing they had cared about was to obtain work and bread or, if they were small officials, to gain security against interference of the Party. The former soldiers and the workers liked the sports, the hikes in the open while singing the old soldiers' songs better than the distasteful political service with the Party.

The way requests for discharge from the SA were treated is shown by the following personal experience: The Chief of Staff LUTZE had referred before the press in Berlin to the "performances" of the SA and at

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same time stressed the fact that belonging to the SA was purely voluntary and that no SA man was kept in the SA against his will. Upon this I renewed my previous requests for discharge and this time I referred to the statements of LUTZE. I declared that I did not want to remain any longer in the SA. I was informed that the SA was no transient hotel and I was given to understand that upon a further repetition of my request my employers would be notified. Some time later I was made Scharfuehrer.

After the bloody repression of the ROEHM putsch, in which , however, the Rhineland SA did not take any part, the Party again wanted to attract the SA, which had practically slipped away from it. The SA had aroused the anger of HITLER and felt itself left out in the cold. It started a course of political instruction, but this soon died out because the old SA leaders were not suited for the purpose. It was always the same trite old catchwords that were repeated. The old SA leaders just were no teachers in spiritual matters. For the most part they were not taken seriously by the me and inwardly rejected. There was little interest for politics. NS literature was accepted only unwillingly. Hardly anybody wanted to have the "Stuermer" because of its aims and its low level. The enrolment following the appeals for instruction never exceeded 25 - 30% of the actual force. In the end all means of pressure and threats were no longer of any avail.

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Finally, the SA had in fact no longer any assigned task. It stagnated; there was talk of dissolution. The supreme SA command beat the propada drum and, the less work there was done in the SA, the more ado was made by the professional leaders. These offices fought for their existence.

In order to give the SA a new task, HITLER created the SA sports badge. This gave the multitude which threatened to be split asunder, a new impulse, but not along political, but along athletic lines. Practice was not carried out with military weapons, but there was merely practice in target shooting with small caliber rifles, which was indeed done by any shooting club. Map-reading and use of the marching compass were practised: There was no question of a real military training.

An active propaganda by word of month, in writing and by film tried to justify the necessity for military training by trying to prove that Germany, was again encircled as in 1914, and that all neighboring states were armed to the teeth in order at the given moment to fall upon Germany in order to destroy it: If it only now became known that the attack on the Gleiwitz transmitter by Polish troops was a fake staged at the time b HITLER, it can be imagined with what means the German public was at the time worked upon. But who can hold it against a man if he takes up arms when a foreign power invades his country, and seizes a radio transmitting station?

In 1933 there were in the SA, besides working men and small artisans, a number of small officials who formerly had been soldiers. These men, used to obedience and well-trained as soldiers could be used to best advantage, for which reason they were jealously held on to. These men also would have been glad to have been released particularly in view of later disappointments. There was, however, no niggardliness in the distribution of stars and collar stripes. In the course of the six years most

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of the men by and by reached the rank of Scharfuehrer or Truppenfuehrer. During the war many SA men who went to the front are said to have been further advanced in rank. In many cases they are hardly likely to have been able to hear of their promotion.

The preliminary military training, which was during the last years the only occupation of the SA, was so badly carried out that the other associations, for instance the HITLER youths, refused to accept the SA as teachers and turned to the Wehrmacht.

From the point of view of the Prosecution a clear distinction should be made between the old SA of the so-called "fighting times" and the inflated SA of after the seizure of power, The former was in fact a political fighting troop. The men coming from it also had priority in the new SA. Only they rose to the rank of Sturmfuehrer, With this rank only did the real corps of leaders begin, as was the case in the Wehrmacht where the non-commissioned offices belong with the privates, and the corps of officers represents a closed body of leaders. The words of the Prosecution to the effect that the task of the SA was to hammer National Socialism into the German hearts apply only to old SA, which also in the new SA represented the actual corps of officers. The new SA men did not hammer, they were hammered, although without any appreciable success. The only satisfactory thing in the SA was the good comradeship among the men and the readiness to help. These virtues, however, were not the products of the SA spirit, but arose from the fact that most of the men had been soldiers in the first world war.

It must of course be admitted that there were also in the SA quite a few hotpurs. In such a large organization all types are naturally represented so that anything may be proved by citing examples.

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Is, however, a small percentage of evil-doers enough to declare a whole organization as criminal against humanity, and thereby destroy morally and economically hundreds of thousands of men who are not aware of any guilt? The SA never even hinted at the crimes for which the Party and its sub-organizations now have to answer. Nor did the Cologne SA take any part in the destruction of Jewish houses of worship nor in the other excesses against Jews.

(signed) Alexander GROSSKOPF.

Doc. Reg 369/1946

I certify herewith to the above signature of Mr. Alexander GROSSKOPF, municipal administrative official in Wahn (Rhineland) Linder Mauspfad.

I have not taken cognizance of the contents of the document.

Cologne, 28 February 1946

The notary

(sig) FRANKEN

Seal:

Wilhelm FRANKEN

Notary in Cologne.

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I. Introductory Remarks.

I am pleased to make use of the opportunity to discuss the question whether certain organizations which existed in the National Socialist State are to be treated as criminal. I trust my explanations will contribute to a solution of this problem according to the basic and actual facts and thereby serve the cause of truth and justice. May I say at the outset that my fundamental explanations are based on the irrevocable and for all times and conditions obligatory principles of Christian morality. My actual statements naturally refer to the facts which I was able to observe, mainly therefore, to the conditions and events within the Catholic, religiously inclined inhabitants of Western Germany.

II. Fundamentals.

The present lively discussion concerning the possibility of a collective guilt seems to suffer from the double meaning of the word "guilt".. The word may be used in a very wide sense,to designate any type of misdemeanor, even only a juridical one. Under the conception of collective guilt then, would fall all those obligations which accrue to the members of an organization as a result of the attitude of their authorized representative leadership. It cannot be disputed that a collective guilt applies in this sense not only to the National Socialist Organizations but to the entire German Nation as well. The word "guilt" can also be used, however, to describe a condition in which a person finds himself as a result of a moral offense. In this sense, only the individual person may be considered guilty insofar as he has willingly and knowingly violated a moral obligation. However, it is not in accord with Christian teachings to try and punish as dishonored or criminal a person against whom there is no proof of deliberate and voluntary transgression of a moral law.

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What has been said does not mean that under circumstances, namely when their declared aims and methods are immoral, organizations must also be branded as morally corrupt and criminal. Members of organizations must, however, be affected only insofar as they have joined this organization voluntarily with the knowledge of the organization's moral corruptness, and thereby approved of its criminal aims or have actually participated voluntarily and knowingly in the immoral activity of the organization. Only on this supposition can the moral guilt and punishable acts of its members be deduced from the objection to an organization.

The above conception of the Christian moral teachings concerning collective guilt, is for Catholic Christians particularly binding and will remain so for all times. Quite recently it was expressly confirmed by the Pope who, on a solemn occasion declared before the world: "Erroneous conceptions are circulating throughout the world which declare a person guilty and responsible just because he is a member or a part of a certain community, without first attempting to investigate or prove whether by acts of commission or omission he is personally guilty. That means that one usurps the rights of God, the creator and redeemer who, in the mysterious plannings of his ever-loving Providence, alone is absolute master of events and as such, in his boundless wisdom,

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may decide to link together the fate of the guilty and the innocent, the responsible and the irresponsible." (allocution of 20 February 1946).

III. Facts.

In applying the Christian doctrines set forth to judge membership in the National Socialist Party and its branches, three periods are to be distinguished:

a) The period before the seizure of power. At that time it was clear to one able to judge that the Party represented ideas which are not in accord with Christian moral teachings. To join the movement was entirely voluntary. The bishops publicly pointed out the morally corrupt character of the movement. However, according to my observation, the great masses of followers did not join the movement during this period in order to further their morally corrupt aims, but because they had expected a domestic political victory of the movement to bring about an improvement in the wretched economic, social and political conditions of Germany.

b) The first period after the seizure of power. The Party leadership now attempted to create the impression that with the taking over of the Government it had abjured its aims, which were not in accord with Christian principles. In this matter, HITLER himself gave the most solemn assurances. At the same time there was no doubt that to stand apart from the movement was for the individual connected with the greatest disadvantages. In the face of this new state of affairs, the bishops declared that they could no longer uphold the former warnings and prohibitions. Also in our sections numerous persons joined the Party and subsidiary

H5126-0101

clubs, particularly the SA, the Hitler Youth who had nothing further from their minds than to thereby participate in the service of morally corrupt or even criminal endeavors. There were at the time SA formations which took over church duties, and HJ formations in the country who differentiated themselves only by uniform from church-religious youth-organizations.

c) The later period.

I very soon became apparent that Hitler in 1933 had deceived the German people concerning his view point and intentions. Since then the bishops again and again have found it necessary to publicly fight the morally corrupt ideas and tendencies of the Party and Government. In order to spare the believers, who had joined the Party in good faith the pangs of conscience, the bishops even had public announcements made from all pulpits that the oath given to Hitler could never be obligatory to anything which was in contradiction to the will of God. The compulsion to join the Party and its branches remained. In my opinion therefore during this period mere membership in a party or their auxiliary organizations was by no means considered in the public opinion as proof for the approval of Party tendencies. This applies particularly to the professional organizations, to the youth organizations and the SA. Many younger people joined the SA particularly in order not to be obliged to join the Party itself. According to my observations, some SA formations only carried on a fake existance and often were unable to bring their members together for years.

In the face of these facts, I would consider it a great injustice, if someone were to be considered deserving of punishment for his mere membership in the SA or other National Socialist organizations.

COLOGNE, 4 July 1946.

s/JOS. CARDINALIS FRINGS,

Archbishop of COLOGNE.

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AFFIDAVIT

DECLARATION IN LIEU OF OATH.

The undersigned affirms the following statement in lieu of oath, to be produced at the International Military Tribunal at Nuernberg after having been duly instructed of the penal consequences of a false declaration in lieu of oath:

Personal data: Ritter FRANZ VON HOERAUF, Intern. No.2579/20, Internment Camp 71, born on 16 July 1878 at Landau/Pfalz/, by profession Major General, retired, last address MUNICH, Possart Street 2.

Matter at hand: From March 1931 until spring 1932 I was Chief of Department I of the Supreme SA Leadership (special field, organization, training and employment of the SA). In spring 1931 I received from Chief of Staff ROEHM the order to compile all the individual decrees hitherto issued in a "SA Service Regulations". He then enjoined me to submit each complete section to the legal department for examination as to whether it might contain anything in contradiction to the existing laws. This also was done. After the SA Service Regulation had been printed, I myself sent one copy to the Reich Minister of the Interior, at that time, Severing; but was not notified of any objections. The SA Service Regulations were the only guiding principles for the training and employment of the SA. No secret directives and orders existed which went beyond these or were contrary to them; in the position which I there occupied, they must certainly have come to my knowledge. In the many conferences and conversations, which I had with ROEHM, who was my friend for many years, I never found any intimation that the SA was aiming at any other goals than those openly announced.

Camp 71, Ludwigsburg, on (SIC) s/FRANZ VON HOERAUF
(FRANZ VON HOERAUF)

Subscribed and sworn before me
on 24 June 1946. s/JACK C.WHEELIS.

I, IRENE VRDOVA, certify that I am fully conversant with the English and German languages and that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

s/IRENE VRDOVA.

Nuernberg, 18.7.46.

A F F I D A V I T

by

Professor D. CAJUS FABRICIUS.

I, D. CAJUS FABRICIUS, born on 16 Aug. 1884 in Graudenz, by profession a full professor of theology, residing in Hirchhorn on Neckar, at present Court prison Nuernberg, being duly sworn, depose and say:

a) Personal Data:

I am professor of theology, ordained as a protestant clergyman in 1909, university teacher in Berlin since 1911, in Breslau since 1935. Maintaining relations with numerous foreign Church Leaders through my theological publications, I always strove for peace in the church and among nations. In 1932 I became a member of the NSDAP for Christian-Social reasons, I never belonged to the SA. In 1939, because of my opposition to the anti Christian efforts of HIMMLER, I was imprisoned by him for two months, and in 1940 I was expelled from the Party by BOUHLER without legal party proceedings. After that I had five years city arrest (Stadtarrest) and in 1943 I lost my office as professor as an enemy of the state. Since 17 June 45 I have been interned in Ludwigsburg.

b) Concerning the Case:

The religious attitude of the SA. As an objective observer I have ascertained the following:

1. During the period after 1930, especially after 1933, large numbers of Protestant theological students in the institutions where I was teaching, th is the universities of Berlin and Breslau, were at the same time members of the SA. I myself - apart from my Christian-Social service for the unemployed - was also induced to join the Party because of the outstanding character of these students. The fact that these future spiritual advisers of the people, young men of undubtedly the most noble conviction, became

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members of the SA in such large numbers, proves irrefutably that the SA cannot have been a criminal organization.

2. As a student of theology from Lauban in Silesia reported to me in 1936, since 1933 all the members of the Young Men's Christian Association from there, that is an association of strongly Christian laymen, joined the SA together. It is not conceivable that members of this world-wide Christian organization, which has its headquarters in the U.S.A., should have joined a criminal organization.

3. At the end of 1933 I had a conference in Berlin with the two highest officers of the Salvation Army; the latter informed me that the asylums of the Salvation Army for the homeless and neglected in Berlin had been emptied in the course of 1933, because as a result of the National Socialist rising unemployment had considerably decreased. The Salvation Army voluntarily put these asylums at the disposal of the SA for its purposes. As is well known, the Salvation Army is a Christian organization, which has as its principal goal the conversion of those who have gone astray. And so if the Salvation Army transferred its asylums to the administration of the SA, this proves, that it did not consider the SA as a criminal organization, but on the contrary that it considered the brown battalions precisely as a Salvation Army.

Notes.

1. If in the period before 1933 individual Germans in great distress sought and found refuge in the SA, this does not mean that there they allied themselves with a gang of robbers. On the contrary, they wanted to extricate themselves from the desperate situation in which the German people found itself under the pressure of the Treaty of Versailles, and - with the help

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of one party in one democratic state - to return to a decent and orderly life.

2. If in later years isolated attacks occurred against Christianity and the churches even within the SA, this, just as in the NSDAP altogether, is traceable to the acts of individuals, who fell away from the Christian principles of National Socialism and must therefore be considered as illegitimate.

The above-mentioned facts correspond to the truth. This statement has been made of my own free will and without any compulsion. I have read it through and signed it.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22 day of July 1946 at Nuernberg, Germany.

s/ Signature

Name, Grade, ASN

I, KVET. LIKOVSKA, being thoroughly conversant with both English and German, certify that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of this affidavit.

s/ Signature.

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Dr. ASCHENAUER, Defense Counsel for the SA. ~~H~~ 16

Affidavit

Being informed of the consequences of a false affidavit and of the fact that it will be submitted to the International Military Tribunal at Nuernberg, I state as follows in lieu of oath:

Personal Matter: Leonhard GONTERMANN

Born on 16 June 1896 at Siegen/Westphalia;

Profession: Merchant;

formerly SA-Gruppenfuehrer and Chief of the Personnel Office of the Supreme SA-Leadership;

at present in Palace of Justice at Nuernberg.

Relevant matter: On 23. 6. 1946 I discussed with Walter SCHELLENBERG his Affidavit No. 3202/USA Exhibit 435 submitted by the Prosecution. Walter SCHELLENBERG stated in this connection that a misunderstanding might exist here; it might very well deal here with the talks of the SA-Leadership with the Reich SS-Leadership regarding the question of the City and Rural Guards. About the middle of 1943, after LUTZE's death, Max JUETTNER, as permanent representative of the Chief of Staff, was the Fuehrer of the SA.

I know for certain that he neither desired nor suggested that the SA participate in guarding concentration camps, prisoners-of-war camps or in the supervision of forced labor; nor did he ever carry on or order discussions concerning this.

Also until the end of the war no directives whatever in this matter were sent to the SA; nor under the Chief of Staff SCHEPMANN.

It would have been in contradiction to the very nature of the SA to concern itself with such tasks.

The SA as an organization was not concerned.

s/ Leonhard GONTERMANN

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of June 1946.

s/ Robert B. STANNES
AT 01281783
1st Lt. Inf.

H5126-0107

I, Paul SCHMIDT, fully conversant with the English and German languages, testify that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

s/ Dr. Paul SCHMIDT

H5126-0108

He directed the district leaders (Kreisleiter) to turn out of the hall officials who wished to attend a party meeting in their official uniforms.

For the Landrat or the administrative officials, activity in the staff of the District Leader or in the District Office for municipal policy, would have been most suitable. Since, however, it was to be foreseen that in administrative questions, in particular of a municipal-political nature, divergences of views between representatives of the State and of the Party would become inevitable, because of the splitting up between Party considerations and claims de lege ferenda and practical administrative work de lege lata underpinned by professional officials, many preferred not to joint the political authoritative power of the District Leader as political leaders. Precisely for this reason also administrative officials, like many other officials, often declared themselves prepared for honorary cooperation in the Security Service, especially as there it was possible for them to take also a critical attitude to all acute local administrative problems of their professional sphere, on the strength of their own technical knowledge and professional experience, whereas this would appear hopeless through official channels when high Party Leadership and State Offices e.g. Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter were combined. The following were among such problems for example:

Relationship of the Party to the State.
Unity of the administration.
Policy of incorporation of the large towns.
Exaggerated organization of economy.
Relationship between the borough where the plant is established and the borough where the worker is domiciled.

s/Dr.HORST LAUBE

I certify that Dr.HORST LAUBE personally appeared before me on the day of June 1946 and after being duly sworn, signed the above statement in my presence.

signature

Captain Inf. 0.358 239

I, IRENE VRBOVA, certify that I am fully conversant with the English and German languages and that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

s/IRENE VRBOVA.

H5126-0109

The attempt to withdraw from this Partyservice world have led to the severest consequences according to the Disciplinary Penal Code and the Police Code. Even a resignation from his post, even under the renunciation of lawful claims was, since 1939, expressly denied to the official. Considering the total devotion which the NSDAP claimed to be entitled to, it would have been absolutely impossible for the official to create for himself a new existence against the will of the Party.

Even if many officials, as well as many Germans, recognized more and more slowly the contration between the Theory of the political slogan and the and the practise of the actual execution of the Party program, and the attitude of the authoritative leaders of the Party and State, the officials took these slips in general for local divergences of turbulent subordinates, which could still be removed. Of the conditions in Concentration camps and measures really taken against the Jews, of which they only learned after the end of the war, the officials as a whole had just as little knowledge as the majority of the German people. The knowledge of the true association of the leadership in the National State had remained limited to small circles, which, at the control point, could remain in the closest contact with authoritative headquarters. They must also bear the responsibility for it.

Having myself been an administrative official, I can from my own experience better judge the special conditions of this particular group. So, for instance the Gauleiter of Saxony, who was at the same time Reich Statthalter, demanded that the Landraete appear in Party uniform and their activity in a party organization. The tried to achieve their entry into an Party orgnization by preventing, them from wearing the official uniform lawfully permitted by the Reich.

H5126-0110

Even in the event of the Party Chancery ordering the official, who is Partymember to be presumed politically reliable, this did not prevent the Gauleiter of Saxony from demanding, that any official, in order to prove his reliability, must put himself or his family at the disposal of the State to perform small tasks for the Party or any of its organizations. By this means moreover, the Party could increase to the desired extent the workers required for the performance of its small duties. The official, if he did not wish to imperil the basis of the existence of his family or of his career, had no alternative but to accede to the demands of the Party. He believed also by so doing to fulfill in the best manner his duty towards the community, because he had to consider the service in the Party or in any of its organizations according to the principle repeatedly proclaimed "Party and State are one and the same" as a service for the community as service in the National Socialist State, recognized by International Law. To which Party organization the individual official finally offered his services was not seldom a matter of chance or a question of particular personal sympathy towards the representatives of the local Party organizations Moreover it was often of some importance whether an organization offered the possibility of making use of technical knowledge and experiences in the Party's service or of cultivating personal inclinations. This may explain that,for instance, many teachers from amongst the officials decided on the HITLER Youth service or Party training; officials engaged in Charity matters decided on the NSV, cashiers on the discharge of Party financial matters, members coming from farming families decided to enter the Riders' SA or Riders' SS, technicians the National Socialist Motor or Flying Corps. The result was, that the officials belonged to the different organizations, to these which are considered criminal by the Board of Prosecution as well as to those which are not stated to be of a criminal character.

H5126-0111

These principles and rules did not generally represent the start of new adjustments, which had first to be transferred to administrative practice, but they to great extent lent legal form and basis to an actual condition created by the Party. As the actual conditions were later again changed by numerous sanctions of exceptions from the general regulations, it was intended from 1944 to bring the Reich-Principles and the Regulations concerning careers into agreement with actual practice. This seemed to be imminent in April 1945. According to the rules hitherto valid, an official could as a rule only be engaged or promoted if he guaranteed his unconditional backing of the National Socialist State at any time. The minimum of loyalty of the official towards his State and leaders is a self evident demand, the fulfilment of which any state must and will demand at any time from its officials, who are its representatives and agents. This therefore is no peculiarity of any authoritarian system, but likewise the custom and right of democratic states. The method of its execution is alone everywhere authoritative for the consequences of such a principle.

The political judgments, which were to certify the reliability of the officials within the meaning of the German Civil Service Law, were established according to the principles which had been issued by the Party through the Party Chancery and not by the State, in which case the Reich Ministry of the Interior would have been competent.

As the Gauleiter, who fancied themselves to be more and more independant, regarded these principles as general directives only,.they considered themselves authorised to give orders regarding the establishment of political certificates by far exceeding the ones of the Supreme Party leadership.

H5126-0112

Only a very small number of those officials, who had chosen this life long profession of official out of inner conviction, and who from the very start were properly and expertly schooled for their career joined the NSDAP. Only after the Party had, in a manner the legality of which was not contested internationally, succeeded in 1933 in forming a government recognised by international law, after the other parties had been dissolved and had declared itself to be the sole admitted political form of organization of the German people, greater number of officials and teachers of all kinds were prepared to join the Party. This happened principally because the official had, in his official capacity, in any case devoted his knowledge and strength to the nation and soon after the assumption of power, the Party leaders made use of the officials' duty of obedience and their dependence upon the political references to be obtained from the Party, for the purpose of inducing as many officials and teachers as possible to join the Party or its organizations.

Legal basis for the relation between the official and the Party were in particular the Paragraph 26, 27 and 28 of the German Law for Employees, together with the Reich Principles issued for its enactment, dealing with the employment, appointment and promotion of employees dated 14 October 1935 together with the regulations issued from time to time for the individual careers of officials.

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Dr.HORST LAUBE Nuernberg, 18 June 1946

Declaration in lieu of oath.

I, Dr.HORST LAUBE, born on 12 April 1892 at Chemnitz, formerly Ministerialrat in the Reich Ministry of the Interior and residing at Garmisch, at present in the court prison at Nuernberg submit herewith the following declaration in lieu of oath, being fully aware that this deposition is destined to be submitted to the International Military Tribunal at Nuernberg and that any false declarations would be severely punished.

I state:

After having undergone the normal education for an administrative official of the higher grade, I occupied in the normal career of a professional administration official the post of Landrat in Stollberg from 1933 until 1935, and the same post in Zwickau from 1935 until 1940. In 1940 I was temporarily called up to the Wehrmacht and appointed to the Military Government in France. From March 1944 I was charged with the direction of the subordinate branch in the Ministry of the Interior in which the principal affairs of the employees serving public bodies and of the officials were dealt with, and finally as Ministerialrat.

Between 1919 and 1933 I was employed in an honorary capacity on the Council of the former Provincial Association of higher ranking official in Saxony dealing with trade union matters.

Having belonged to the German Peoples Party I joined on 1 May 1935 the NSDAP and from 1934/35 collaborated in an honorary capacity with the Security Service in questions of its interior administration, and since 1937 as SS Untersturmfuehrer.

Having come into contact with many officials of all careers, salary groups and localities on account of my various posts and activities, I consider myself competent to make general depositions regarding the relations between the officials and the NSDAP.

H5126-0114

IV. In addition, at Hammelburg a number of SA members made affidavits setting forth that former units in question took no part in the action against Jews in November 1938.

I would further point out that former SA members at Internees Camp 9 at Hammelburg, in the attitude they took at the International Military Tribunal on 16th February 1946 and 22d May 1946, did not deny that individual SA members participated in actions against Jews and that in these two documents expression is given to a feeling of shame at the events of November 1938 and the necessity for reparations. I point that out. When remonstrances were made in November 1938 I learnt from my Standartenfuehrer that there was no command by the highest SA leadership.

(signed) Edgar Stolzner

Subscribed and sworn to before me
this 2d August 1946.

(signed) S. W. Binder
Capt. Inf. 0356239

I, Erna W. Schwabenland, fully conversant with the English and German languages, testify that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

(signed) Erna W. Schwabenland

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T R A N S L A T I O N

A f f i d a v i t

I make the following statement, to be produced before the International Military Tribunal at Nuernberg, after being cautioned as to liability of punishment for making a false affidavit:

Re. My person: Edgar Stolzner, born 13th August 1892 at Nuernberg, married, Senior Judge of a District Court (dismissed) and juridical Senior Burgomaster, retired; domiciled at Buetthard via Wurzburg; member of the SA since 1933 and latterly legal advisor to the No. 79 SA Reiterstandarte at Wurzburg, with the rank of SA-Sturmfuehrer (2nd Lt.).

Re. the matter: From 6th November 1945 to 9th July 1946 I was a political internee and was from the end of 1945 in Internment Camp 9, Hammelburg.

I there received an order from the German camp leadership to collect and prepare, at the request of the International Military Tribunal, Nuernberg, evidence as to the criminal nature of the former SA, in particular to collect affidavits. I was assisted by a Working Commission made up of former members of the SA.

After previous discussion, the affidavits were taken down. Then they were dictated (a small part in handwriting). Before they were signed by the individual former SA members, they were discussed with them again, then they were read to them. After that the members read the affidavits themselves and if it happened that any given point proved itself to be based on a misunderstanding, the affidavit was re-dictated. Then the individual former SA members concerned signed the affidavits. I cautioned the individual former SA members before they signed and instructed them regarding the meaning of an affidavit, in particular regarding liability of punishment as it affects the submission of an untrue affidavit to the International Military Tribunal, Nuernberg, and admonished them to tell the truth.

These affidavits also concerned themselves with the criminal action against the Jews in November 1938. I extract the following from these affidavits:

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I. The factual or assumed execution order on the stationery of the SA Brigade 50 (Starkenburg) dated Darmstadt, November 11th 1938, and addressed to SA-Gruppe Kurpfalz, mentions an order of the former Gruppenfuehrer of Gruppe Kurpfalz stating that all Jewish synagogues were to be burnt down. Concerning this, the former Fuehrer of SA-Standarte 166 at St. Ingbert (Saar), Willi Kallert, has subritted an affidavit dated March 14th 1946. An extract follows:

" I was Fuehrer of SA-Standarte 166 at St. Ingbert (Saar) from 1936 to May 1939. SA-Standarte 166 did not participate in the action against the Jews in November 1938. Within the district of the Standarte named no excesses against Jews took place. In my capacity of Fuehrer of the Standarte I did not issue any sort of order to my subordinate units to participate in the action against the Jews. The synagogue at St. Ingbert remained undamged. In St. Ingbert proper demonstrators had collected in front of the residence of an elderly Jewish woman. The Burgomaster Dr. Norbert Schier telephoned me asking me what could be done about this demonstration. He took the part of the Jewish woman. My answer was for him to have a policeman disperse the demonstrators. I disapproved of their action. My standarte belonged to SA-Brigade 151 and to the SA-Gruppe Kurpfalz at Mannheim.

II. The affidavit of Dietrich Erhardt, former Standartenfuehrer of SA Standarte 111 at Rastatt, dated March 6th 1946, shows that such an alleged order from a Gruppenfuehrer, insofar as such an order was issued at all, could not have emanated from a Gruppenfuehrer. It contains, inter alia, the following:

" I was charged with the affairs of the Fuehrer of Standarte 111 at Rastatt while I was SA Hauptsturmfuehrer in 1938. During the night of the action against the Jews in November 1938 my administrative official (Verwaltungs-fuehrer) who had a telephone received a directive over the 'phone from the SA-Brigade in Karlsruhe. He reported at my residence as follows: "The synagogues are to be burnt down and the Jews arrested."
Contents and wording of this order seemed to me to be impossible. I went to my Standarte office and tried to reach the Fuehrer of the SA-Brigade by 'phone. I did not succeed... I then contacted the Gruppe by 'phone. I could not reach the Gruppenfuehrer, who was in Munich. However, I did reach my

H5126-0117

former chief, and then Sturmbannfuehrer Hilbert. I learned from him that my immediate assumption was correct. The directive did not emanate from the supreme SA leadership. The group, on its part, had received the directive from the Gauleitung Wurttemberg of the NSDAP. Simultaneously I heard that Gruppenfuehrer Ludin was absent from Stuttgart. So I stuck to my decision not to execute the order. I reached this decision on the following basis:

1. I refused to take action for moral reasons.

2. I saw no legal basis for giving the SA such orders.

3. Such an action was contrary to the educational aims of the SA as laid down by Gruppenfuehrer Ludin and which I considered fully justified.

I then went to bed again without having passed on the order...

About a fortnight later Gruppenfuehrer Ludin came to me and spoke to me, as he stressed, in a personal manner. What we spoke about was the whole affair and my attitude. I principally mentioned the above 3 points. The conversation ended by his declaring that he shared my attitude. At the same time I learnt that my attitude had given rise to a complaint by the Political Leaders, to my group. The Gruppenfuehrer declined a suggestion to start a prosecution against me. There was no question of any injury to my personality."

The former SA-Standartenfuehrer Dr. Hans Suyckers confirmed as being true the foregoing statement by Standartenfuehrer Erhardt, in an affidavit of which I have not the wording before me but which I well remember.

The former SA Hauptsturmfuehrer Dr. Emil Bens, public prosecutor at Nuernberg (dismissed), stated in an affidavit dated March 6th 1946 that he was informed of a command by his Sturmbannfuehrer to appear immediately as the synagogue was to be set on fire. Bens refused to obey that order and resigned his post of SA fuehrership. In addition, he immediately 'phoned to the Nuernberg chief of police SS-Oberfuehrer Dr. Martin, informed him of what had happened and asked him to take over his post, to prevent it being done. Bens then received the reply from Dr. Martin that nothing could be done, as the command came from higher up. The SA took no action against Bens.

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III. Furthermore, in the following affidavits it is clear that the SA gave no command to participate in action against the Jews:

1. Konrad Rohner, former SA-Brigadefuehrer and Stabsfuehrer of the Bayernwald Group in Bayreuth, in an affidavit dated April 3d 1946, concerning the Bayernwald group and the O.C. of the SA leadership against the Bayernwald group.
2. Martin Wiesner, former SA Standartenfuehrer of the SA Standart 27 at Halberstadt, in an affidavit dated March 7th 1946 concerning the SA Mitte group of the SA 137th Brigade and the SA Standart 127.
3. Helmut Voss, former writer to the SA 27th Brigade at Rathenow, concerning the 27th SA Brigade and the higher SA group against the SA-Brigade 27 in an affidavit dated March 29th 1946.
4. Heinz Fretz, former Sturmfuehrer and writer to the SA Standart 95 concerning the SA Standart 95 and the Bayernwald group as regards SA Standart 95 in an affidavit dated 12th March 1946.
5. Kurt Gruener, former SA Obersturmfuehrer, concerning the SA at Hof/Saale in an affidavit dated April 15th 1946.
6. Felix Gunther, former Administrative Obersturmbannfuehrer, concerning the SA at Kronach in an affidavit dated April 20th 1946, in which it is pointed out in particular that the synagogue at Kronach is still standing; Ludwig Poehner, also regarding the Kronach Standart (this affidavit is not in my possession at the moment but I can remember it).
7. Dr. Hans Hein, SA-Rottenfuehrer, in an affidavit dated 3d April 1946 concerning the Cologne SA.
8. Ludwig Hoeck in an affidavit dated 26th April 1946 concerning the SA-Reiterstandart 79. (This affidavit is also vouched for by me as true).
9. Jakob Jetter in an affidavit dated March 11th 1946 concerning SA Reiterstandart 155.
10. Otto Veit in an affidavit dated March 23d 1946 concerning SA Reiterstandart 97.

Note to 8-10: Hoeck was adjutant to Standart 79, Veit and Jetter led the Standart on behalf of which they testified.

SA AFFIDAVITS

WAR DEPARTMENT

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, $300

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

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SA affidavits

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